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DUE PROCESS AND THE LMRDA: AN ANALYSIS
OF DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE UNION AND
AT THE WORKPLACEt
RISA L. LIEBERWITZ *
To further the goal of union democracy, Congress created a Bill of Rights in Title
I of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA).' Title I, which was
modeled on the United States Constitution, 2 extended selected democratic rights to the
private sector. The LMRDA's Bill of Rights requires the union, as a private organization,
to respect its members' statutory rights to equal treatment, freedom of speech and
assembly, use of judicial process, and procedural due process in internal disciplinary
proceedings. 3
In developing a theoretical approach in statutory Bill of Rights cases, courts must
decide whether to directly apply constitutional theory or whether factors specific to the
union and labor relations context should have primary importance. In addition, courts
that use a constitutional analogy may view the union more as a public institution. Thus,
legislating constitutional rights may affect the nature of the union as a private organi-
zation. The LMRDA raises questions of the nature and effect of statutory "constitutional"
rights.
This Article addresses these questions by focusing on Section 101(a)(5) of Title 1,
which provides procedural due process for union members subject to internal union
discipline. This study will include pre-LMRDA state court decisions which had also
applied a constitutional analogy to create procedural due process rights for union mem-
bers. In order to explain the theoretical underpinnings of union members' procedural
rights, this Article examines constitutional theories of due process and compares them
to due process in the union context.
Constitutional due process 4 and due process in union proceedings show a common
evolution from natural law theory to utilitarian interest balancing. Based on this con-
vergence of theory, this Article attempts to integrate due process interpretation in both
settings by conceptualizing public and private institutions along a single spectrum of due
process rights. This analysis will also explore the rationale behind extending statutory
due process requirements to unions, but not to employers, in the private sector.
t Copyright C 1988 Boston College Law School.
* Assistant Professor, Cornell University, N.Y.S. School of Industrial and Labor Relations,
Department of Collective Bargaining, Labor Law, and Labor History, B.A. 1976, University of
Florida; J.D. 1979, University of Florida. The author would like to thank David S. Bahn for his
much valued work, help, and suggestions in the development and writing or this article.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 411-415 (1982).
2 See United Steelworkers of America, AFL-C1O-CLC v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982).
29 U.S.C. § 411 (1982).
4 The due process clauses in the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Con-
stitution prohibit the federal and state governments, respectively, from depriving any person of
"life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. Coml . . amends. V, XIV.
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1. CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: THEORIES AND APPLICATION
The United States Supreme Court has struggled throughout its history with the
meaning of the constitutional right to due process of law. To some extent, this search
for due process theory has revolved around the question of whether the content of due
process changes with the nature of the legal proceeding. The Court has long accepted
the now axiomatic principle that due process is an inherently flexible concept which
varies with the nature of the proceeding .3
The Supreme Court has applied a number of different theories, drawn from both
legal and moral philosophy, in determining the due process standards the government
must follow before depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property. As concepts of
justice, fairness, and social welfare underlie due process, the relevant legal and moral
philosophy theories are necessarily tied to moral issues .9 The Court has wrestled, how-
ever, with the question of whether constitutional theory should rely on judicial concepts
of morality or whether the Court should attempt to separate judicial interpretation from
moral philosophy.'
The Court has applied two major legal philosophy theories to interpret the due
process clauses: natural law theory and utilitarianism .8 The Supreme Court's natural law
theory has its roots in the natural law philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. 9 Aquinas'
theory held that positive law must be judged by the moral standards found in divine
law, which Aquinas called the "law of nature."'° Regardless of the source of moral
standards for evaluating a society's laws, natural law theorists generally describe an
individual's fundamental rights as existing prior to, and separate from, but recognized
and affirmed in that society's positive law." Natural law philosophy has had a major
influence on American law.' 2 One commentator has described the United States Consti-
tution, particularly the Bill of Rights, as "essentially a natural law document setting out
the fundamental authority of the people under natural taw and guaranteeing the natural
rights of the citizens."' 3
5 See, e.g., Cleveland Ed. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545 (1985); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). See also Kadish,
Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication — A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 325-
27 (1957).
6 D. LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1-3 (1984); Kadish, supra note 5, at 344-46. Concepts
of justice, fairness, and social welfare are connected to basic issues of normative jurisprudence. D.
LYONS, supra at 1.
'The issue of whether law and morality should be separated is a basis for differences among
opposing legal theories. D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 6.
The legal positivism theory has also influenced the Court's interpretation of due process when
it has found liberty or property interests in "an independent source such as state law." Roth, 408
U.S. at 577. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 522-27 (1978). The Court, however,
has specifically rejected the positivist position that state law is also the source of procedural require-
ments. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 539-41. As this Article focuses on the scope of procedures required
after identifying a liberty or property interest, legal positivism will not be addressed further.
9 St. Thomas Aquinas, who lived during the thirteenth century, was "a founder of the 'natural
law' tradition within jurisprudence." D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 7.
L° Id. at 7-10.
Li D. LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 83, 91 (1976); Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?, DAEDALUS
1, 15-16 (Fall 1983).
12 D. LLOYD, supra note 11, at 83; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 427.
i" D. LLOYD, supra note 11, at 83, 91. See also R. MYKKELTVEDT, THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE
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Proponents of the natural rights view of the Constitution's due process clauses seek
to identify the moral content of due process requirements." In substantive and proce-
dural due process cases, the Supreme Court has expressed the clauses' moral content in
terms of an individual's fundamental rights.'' Initially, the Court applied natural law
theory in substantive due process cases to determine whether state legislation had inter-
fered with fundamental rights of private individuals and businesses.i° During the last
part of the nineteenth century through the early period of the New Deal in the 1930's,
the Court applied substantive due process doctrine and, in virtually every case, struck
clown state legislation regulating private property, including an employer's power uni-
laterally to set employment conditions. 17 Commentators have criticized the Court major-
ity's singleminded approach to clue process as protecting only private property interests,
noting that Supreme Court justices imposed their individual moral philosophies rather
than apply an objective interpretation of the Constitution.[" During the New Deal the
Supreme Court rejected natural law theory in substantive due process analysis. The
Court recognized that social legislation was needed during the Depression and that
under such economic circumstances private control of property free from governmental
regulation was not a right found in the "natural order of things." 19
The Supreme Court's initial approach to procedural rights under natural law theory
described a narrower scope of natural rights than the Court had identified in substantive
clue process cases. 2° The procedural due process cases arose as challenges to state criminal
trial procedures under the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. 21 While the Bill
of Rights afforded specific procedural guarantees to federal criminal defendants, the
question remained whether the fourteenth amendment due process clause incorporated
these procedural rights in state proceedings.22 From the 1930's through the 1950's, the
Court rejected the doctrine of incorporation, concluding that procedural rights such as
trial by jury or freedom from self-incrimination existed on a lower "plane of social and
BILL OF RIGHTS 141 (1983); Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARV. L. REV. 149 (1928); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 715-
16 (1975).
" D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 7, 61-62. See also R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY Vii, xi
(1977); Kadish, supra note 5, at 325-27; Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI, L. REV. 28, 50-52 (1976).
1 ' See, e.g., Gidow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("ancient liberties"); In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 448 (1890); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530 (1884).
16 R. MvxxEurvEtyr, supra note 13, at 140; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 4-6,425, 433; Kadish,
supra note 5, at 325. Professor Tribe has defined substantive due process as setting "constitutional
limits on the content of legislative action," while procedural due process sets "constitutional limits
on judicial, executive and administrative enforcement of the legislative dictates." L. TRIBE, supra
note 8, at 502 n.4.
" R. MyktiEurvEcr, supra note 13, at 29, 31, 140; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 4-6, 425, 433;
Grey, supra note 13, at 716; Kadish, supra note 5, at 325.
18 R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 34; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 6-7; Kadish, supra note 5,
at 325-28, 335-36.
19 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 6; Kadish, supra note 5, at 325; Ratner, The Function of the Due
Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1048, 1051-57 (1968).
20 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 5-7.
21 R. MYKKELTVEUT, supra note 13, at 37.
42 Id. at 34, 37.
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moral values"" than substantive rights such as freedom of speech." Instead, the Court
adopted a case-by-case approach under a flexible fair trial rule" which tested whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, the state had provided a criminal defendant with
a fundamentally fair trial. 26
The Court based the fair trial rule on natural law concepts and described the due
process clause as protecting fundamental rights" in accord with canons of decency" and
notions of fairness. 29 In determining, however, whether state procedures were "shocking
to a universal sense of justice,"5° the Court generally deferred to the state's procedural
system.'' As in the substantive due process cases, commentators criticized this one-sided
approach, noting that the Court was engaged in a substantive interpretation of the
Constitution." Justice Black warned that the fair trial rule endowed the Court with
limitless power to alter constitutional standards to agree with the Court's understanding
of natural law requirements."
With a change in the Court's membership during the late 1950's and early 1960's,
the fair trial rule lost favor and the Court adopted the doctrine of selective incorpora-
tion." Using this approach, the Court decided whether specific Bill of Rights provisions
23 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), quoted in R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at
46.
24 R. MYKKELTVEDT, Apra note 13, at 46-47. See also Kadish, supra note 5, at 325; Mashaw,
supra note 14, at 47 n.61.
26 R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 51.
26 Id. at 39-54, 142-43; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 507, 512-13, 539-40; Grey, supra note 13,
at 717; Kadish, supra note 5, at 323-27.
27 See, e.g., Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 16 (1950); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 471-72
(1942); Palko, 302 U.S. at 325.
29
 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), discussed in
R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 56-57. Supreme Court decisions prior to its formulation of the
fair trial rule also based procedural due process findings on natural law concepts. See, e.g., Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101-06 (1908); Hurtado, 110 U.S at 530-37.
ss Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 16; see R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 42-52; Ratner, supra note 19,
at 1054-57.
"Betts, 316 U.S. at 462, discussed in R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 49-51.
3 ' R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 42-51, 55; Kadish, supra note 5, at 325; Ratner, supra
note 19, at 1055-56.
32 R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 53-55; Kadish, supra note 5, at 326-27. In applying
natural law concepts to procedural due process issues, the Court has attempted to avoid totally
subjective decision-making by referring to objective sources in order to define the fundamental
nature of procedural rights. These sources include opinions of the Constitution's framers, early
English common law, opinions of state legislatures, opinions of other federal and state courts, and
"the opinions of other countries in the Anglo-Saxon tradition." Kadish, supra note 5, at 328. See
also R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 52.
"Adamson, 332 U.S. at 69 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black stated that the Adamson majority's
constitutional theory "endow[s the Court] . . . with boundless power under 'natural law' periodically
to expand and contract constitutional standards to conform to the Court's conception of what at a
particular time constitutes 'civilized decency' and `fundamental liberty and justice. —
 Id. See also
Kadish, supra note 5, at 335-36.
" R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 67-82. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), incorporating
the fourth amendment, was "the opening shot in [this] doctrinal revolution." R. MYKKELTVEDT,
supra note 13, at 69. During this period, prior to adopting the selective incorporation doctrine
formally, the Court also applied the fair trial rule "to raise the minimal standards of fairness
required by due process law." Id. at 64.
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were incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due process clause." The Court still
applied natural law theory because it incorporated only those provisions of the Bill of
Rights which it deemed "a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a criminal
prosecution." s6 By 1969 virtually every procedural protection in the fourth through the
eighth amendments had been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment due process
clause."
The Supreme Court also has interpreted due process rights under the legal philos-
ophy theory of utilitarianism. Since the Court first applied this theory in the late 1950's, 38
utilitarianism has become the dominant theory in noncriminal procedural due process
cases." In contrast to natural law theorists, utilitarian theorists beginning with Jeremy
Bentham sought to separate the study of law from the study of morals." Bentham
developed a "principle of utility" as an objective moral standard of positive law 4 L and
argued that laws and governmental actions are valid only if they advance the greatest
societal good.42 Bentharn's social welfare theory determines a law's validity by balancing
quantitatively measured interests in order to reach the result that embodies the best
interests of the general welfare."
Scholars have criticized utilitarian theory for its failure to recognize that basic moral
rights should remain intact regardless of whether the principle of utility would justify
their infringement." This failure to identify the independent moral grounds for these
rights forms the basis for opposition to using utilitarianism in constitutional analysis."
COnstitutional interpretation under utilitarianism would protect rights solely for their
instrumental value." In procedural due process cases, an instrumentalist approach would
protect specific procedural rights only if the procedures enhanced the accuracy of the
55 R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 60, 67-82.
51; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965). See also R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 74,
79-80; Ratner, supra note 19, at 1057, 1096-97.
37 The only Bill of Rights provisions which have not been explicitly incorporated are the second
amendment right to bear arms, the third amendment prohibition of quartering troops in private
homes, the fifth amendment requirement of a grand jury indictment, the seventh amendment right
to a jury trial in civil cases involving at least twenty dollars, and the eighth amendment protection
against excessive bail. R. MYKKELTVEDT, supra note 13, at 82.
se Mashaw, supra note 14, at 47 n.61,
" L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 539-43; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 46-49; Saphire, Specifying Due
Process Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. Pn. L. REV. 1 l 1,
133-39 (1978); Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on the Use of
Interest Balancing, 88 HANN/. L. REV. 1510, 1510-14 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Specifying- the Procedures].
4° D. LLOYD, supra note 11, at 100; D, LYONS, supra note 6, at 10, 113, i26.
41 D. LLOYD, supra note 11, at 102; D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 10.
42 D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 112 ("[U]tilitarianism says that we should serve the greater
aggregate interest, taking into account all the benefits and burdens that might result.").
43 Id. at 112-13. See also I), LLOYD, supra note 11, at 100; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 51.
44 R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 4, 12, 92, 149, 191-93, 272; D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 126-
28; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-43; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 51; Saphire, supra note 39, at 151-
52, 155; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1526-27, 1542-43.
45 R, DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 4, 12, 92, 191-93, 272; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-43;
Mashaw, supra note 14, at 51; Saphire, supra note 39, at 151-52, 155; Note, Specifying the Procedures,
supra note 39, at 1526-27, 1542-43.
4" R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at vii, 4; L. TRIBE, supra note 89, at 525-26, 540-43; Mashaw,
supra note 14, at 48; Saphire, supra note 39, at 151-52, 155-56; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra
note 39, at 1523-25.
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proceeding's outcome:12 This analysis, however, ignores the moral content of due process
standards which protect procedural rights in order to promote the intrinsic values of
fairness, individual autonomy, and integrity - even though the accuracy of the pro-
ceedings may not be enhanced or may even be lessened." For example, a coerced
confession is not admissible evidence in criminal trials even when independent evidence
proves its truthfulness. 4° Clearly, the right against compulsory self-incrimination and the
right to due process promote and protect a fundamental concern - individual dignity
- and that outweighs the utilitarian value of accuracy."
The Supreme Court has adopted utilitarian interest balancing as its primary mode
of analysis in cases involving procedural due process in administrative proceedings." In
contrast to criminal trials where a liberty interest is at stake, in state or federal admin-
istrative proceedings due process must be afforded because an individual's property
interest is at stake. 52 The number of Supreme Court cases in this area greatly increased
in the early 1970's due to the expansion of public sector agencies providing government
benefits, contracts, and employment and the Court's determination that individuals could
have a property interest in these government benefits."
42 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-42; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 48; Saphire, supra note 39, at
158, 162; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1516.
" D. LYONS, supra note 6, at 205-06; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 525-26, 559-60; Mashaw, supra
note 14, at 46-52; Ratner, supra note 19, at 1106, 1114-15; Saphire, supra note 39, at 151-52, 155-
62, 193-94; Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes - A Plea for "Process Values," 60
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2-7 (1974); Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1525-27, 1538-39.
Commentators have criticized the Court for relying on factors such as the cost of a procedural
protection when it determines due process issues. L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-42; Saphire, supra
note 39, at 151; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1523.
42 Kadish, supra note 5, at 347.
s° Id. For other examples of a conflict in interpreting rights under utilitarian theory and an
intrinsic value theory, see id. (stomach pumping); Ratner, supra note 19, at 1106 (search and seizure;
prosecutor's comment on defendant's failure to testify); Summers, supra note 48, at 17-18, 23, 24,
29 (stomach pumping; other searches and seizures; coerced testimony and confessions).
Professor Dworkin has identified utilitarian interest balancing as a legislative method of analysis,
inappropriate for judicial interpretation of constitutional rights which should not be negated by
assertions of the general welfare. R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 82-83, 92, 199-204. See also Note,
Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1523-24.
s' See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972); see also L., TRIBE, supra note 8,
at 514-27, 540-50; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 29-30, 36, 46-48; Saphire, supra note 39, at 158-
62; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1510-15.
52 In administrative law cases, a liberty interest may also exist when an agencY's action injures
the individual's reputation. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74. According to Professor Tribe, the
Roth Court divided the procedural due process inquiry into two steps: ''(1) the question of what
specific interests are entitled to due process protection" and "(2) the inquiry into what process is
due." L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 507. in addressing the initial question, the Court determines
whether a property or liberty interest has been created by "an independent source such as state
law." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. If such an interest has been created, the Court moves to the second
step to determine the procedures which are constitutionally required. Id. at 569-70. While the
Court continues to apply a legal positivist approach to find property or liberty interests, a majority
of the justices has specifically rejected the minority's positivist theory that state law is also the source
of procedural requirements. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 539-41. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 522-
27.
For a discussion of the contrast between the Court's treatment of the individual's interest in
criminal and non-criminal procedural due process cases, see Saphire, supra note 39, at 134-39, 191
n.359, 193.
55 L. TRIBE, supra note 8 at 514-15; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 28-29.
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The Court has applied utilitarian theory to administrative proceedings by balancing
the parties' opposing interests to determine which procedure will assure the accuracy of
the outcome." The theory is expressed in a formula which balances various factors,
including the private interest affected, the risk that the procedure may erroneously
deprive an individual of that interest, the probable value of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards, and the government's interest, including the financial and ad-
ministrative burdens that additional procedural safeguards would entail. In general,
therefore, the Court balances the individual's stake in a property interest against the
institution's interest in expedient decision-making. 56 Although it initially placed great
importance on the individual's stake in receiving governmental benefits, 57 the Supreme
Court has steadily restricted the scope of procedural protections by giving more weight
to institutional interests."
The 1970 case of Goldberg v. Kelly" began a "due process revolution"" and many
subsequent cases have sought to extend its principles." In Goldberg, the Supreme Court
held that procedural due process required that a state afford an individual the oppor-
tunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to terminating welfare benefits." The Court
weighed the institutional interest against the individual's property interest and deter-
mined that a pretermination hearing is required." The Court also enumerated specific
procedures to protect the individual from erroneous benefits termination pending a
subsequent statutory fair hearing." Although the Goldberg Court stated that the preter-
mination hearing need not be judicial or quasi-judicial," the Court later described
Goldberg as requiring a full adversarial hearing before the government may terminate a
benefit." The Goldberg Court found that procedural due process under these circum-
stances required notice of the reasons for termination, the opportunity to present oral
• 54 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-42; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 48; Saphire, supra note 39, at
158, 162; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1515-16.
55 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For discussion of the Eldridge utilitarian
formulation, see L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-42; Mashaw, supra note 14. See also Ake v. Oklahoma,
470 U.S. 68, 77-83 (1985), where the Supreme Court applied the Eldridge balancing test to hold
that a state must supply an indigent criminal defendant with psychiatric assistance when sanity at
the time of the offense will be a significant factor at trial, in order to increase the likelihood of the
verdict's accuracy. Id.
56 See Saphire, supra note 39, at 154-56; Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1515,
1523 (government's interest in expediency).
57 See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 525-27; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 29 (discussing Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
56 One commentator has described Eldridge as a possible "turning point in the Court's resolution
of procedural due process issues. Since Eldridge, plaintiffs in due process cases have been uniformly
unsuccessful, and a marked tendency has emerged to avoid balancing' by finding the due process
clause inapplicable." Mashaw, supra note 14, at 29 n.5.
69 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
66 Mashaw, supra note 14, at 29. See also Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv.
1267, 1273-1304 (1975).
61 See, e.g., Wolff v, McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
69 397 U.S. at 266-70.
63 Id. at 266-67.
64 Id. at 268-69.
65 Id. at 266.
66 Laudermill, 470 U.S. at 545 (1985).
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arguments and evidence, the right to confront witnesses, the right to retain counsel, and
a statement by the decision-maker of reasons for the determination. 67 The Court also
required an impartial decision-maker, although an agency employee with prior involve-
ment in the case could fill this role so Long as that employee had not participated in the
determination under review."
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions show a general trend to apply utilitarian theory
to restrict the scope of procedural due process in administrative proceedings 69 One
issue which demonstrates the Court's retreat from Goldberg is the question of the scope
of due process protections the agency must provide before terminating a governmental
benefit. In several cases the Court has placed great weight on the institutional interest
in internal control and expedient decision-making and has upheld the governmental
deprivation of a property interest before a full evidentiary hearing." In fact, in three
recent cases — two involving the discharge of governmental employees 7 ' and the other
involving disability benefits termination72 — the Court approved pretermination proce-
dures which did not provide any kind of hearing." In each case the majority found that
a pretermination opportunity to contest in writing the proposed agency action protected
against erroneous decisions, where the agency would also provide a post-termination
hearing. 74
67
 397 U.S. at 269-71.
68 Id.
69 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 540-42; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 29 n.5.
" Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343.
71 Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
72 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
75 In Loudermill, two public employees were discharged before the administrative hearings to
review the evidence of cause for the termination, as provided by Ohio law. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at
535-37.
An oral hearing before a federal administrative law judge concerning Social Security disability
benefits termination occurs only after the Social Security Administration has affirmed the state
agency's termination of benefits. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335-39. See Mashaw, .supra note 14, at 32-36.
In Arnett, a federal employee was discharged pursuant to procedures established by the Lloyd-
LaFollette Act (5 U.S.C. 7501), which requires that the employer provide the employee with written
notice of the charges and an opportunity to file a written answer. Federal regulations included an
additional right to reply orally to the charges, but provided an evidentiary hearing only after the
discharge. Arnett, 416 U.S. at 140-46.
74 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46; Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 338, 348-49; Arnett, 416 U.S. at 168—
70.
The Loudermill Court applied the Eldridge utilitarian balancing test to conclude that due process
required that the government provide the employee an opportunity to respond to charges "either
in person or in writing" as an initial check against mistaken decisions .... To require more than
this prior to termination would intrude to an unwarranted extent on the government's interest in
quickly removing an unsatisfactory employee." 470 U.S. at 545-46. The discharged employees in
Loudermill sought only notice and an opportunity to respond. Id.
In Arnett, a majority of the Court concluded that the Lloyd-La Follette Act's discharge proce-
dures satisfied due process but could not agree on a majority opinion. A plurality, consisting of
Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stewart, found that the legislature, because it
created a property interest in employment, could simultaneously limit the scope of procedural
protection afforded prior to deprivation of that interest. 416 U.S. at 152-55. A majority of the
Court explicitly rejected this position in Loudermill. 470 U.S. at 540-41. In Arnett, Justices Powell
and Blackmun, concurring in part and concurring in the result in part, applied a balancing process
to conclude that the government's interest in maintaining control over personnel management and
added administrative costs and delay outweighed the employee's interest in a prior evidentiary
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The stress on institutional interests has also narrowed the scope of due process in
the area of an individual's right to an impartial decision-maker. This issue arises in
administrative determinations where an agency acts both as prosecutor and judge."
Under utilitarian interest balancing, separating these functions and requiring a neutral
adjudicator from outside the agency would best protect an individual's property inter-
est." This procedural safeguard, however, conflicts with the institutional interest in
control over agency decisions and places the Court in the interventionist position of
restructuring the basic decision-making process."
To retain institutional autonomy, the Court has compromised the right to impartial
adjudications in the administrative context. By emphasizing the importance of an agen-
cy's autonomy and efficiency, the Court has held that an individual's right to an impartial
decision-maker was not violated where a governmental agency official decided to ter-
minate public benefits or employment, even where the official was previously involved
with that particular case." The Court reached this result by stressing the instrumentalist
hearing. 416 U.S. at 167-68. justices Powell and Blackmun concluded further that the pre-termi-
nation procedures would "minimize the risk of error in the initial removal decision." Id. at 170.
In Eldridge, the Court applied its utilitarian interest balancing formula to find that the individ-
ual's private interest in disability benefits was lower than the interest of welfare recipients because
disability benefits did not depend on financial need. 424 U.S. at 340-43. Furthermore, the Eldridge
Court found that the lack of an oral evidentiary hearing prior to benefits termination would not
affect the decision-maker's accuracy because of the agency's reliance on documented medical
evidenct. Id. at 343-44. The Court also noted the additional costs which the government would
incur by requiring a pre-termination hearing. 7d. at 347. For a discussion and criticism of the Court's
reasoning, see Mashaw supra note 14, at 37-46.
7a
	 e.g., Hortonville it. School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482,484-85
(1976) (school board acted as negotiator in collective bargaining with teachers and voted to discharge
the strikers); Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335-39 (Social Security disability benefits terminated after the
Social Security Administration affirmed (lie termination of benefits; post-termination hearing before
an administrative law judge reviewed by Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration);
Arnett, 416 U.S. at 136-37 (employee in Regional Office of the Office of Economic Opportunity
discharged based on alleged slander of the Regional Director (RD); RD reviewed rebuttal submitted
by employee prior to discharge and made the decision to terminate employee); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408. U.S. 471,485-86 (1972) (determination of reasonable grounds for parole revocation at prelim-
inary hearing following arrest of a parolee may be judged by another parole officer not directly
involved in the case); Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 271 (hearing on eligibility for welfare benefits judged
by a welfare official involved partially in the case but who has "not ... participated in making the
determination under review"). See also L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 556.
76 See Saphire, supra note 39, at 167 n.244 (expressing the view that a neutral decision-maker
"might be essential for purposes of reliable and unbiased factual and substantive determinations
. [butJ does not seem fundamental to the inherent dignitary concerns of participation and
revelation").
" See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 155 n.21 (plurality opinion, expressing concern over circumstances in
which the official bringing the charges also makes the discharge determination as the agency head;
here, a finding of bias would disqualify all of his subordinates, resulting in a hearing "conducted
by someone wholly outside of the ... agency").
78 See, e.g., Hortonville ft. School Dist., 426 U.S. at 496 ("Iplermitting the Board to make the
decision at issue preserves its control over school district affairs"); Arnett, 416 U.S. at 155 n.21 ("The
decision of an employee's supervisor to dismiss an employee for such cause as will promote the
efficiency of the service' will all but invariably involve a somewhat subjective judgment on the part
of the supervisor .... We do not believe that Congress ... required the complexities which would
be injected into the [Lloyd-LaFollettJ Act by our Brother White['s finding or bias]."); Goldberg, 397
U.S. at 266-67 (describing the required hearing as distinct from "a judicial or quasi -judicial trial,"
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goal of accurate decision-making, which agency personnel can fulfill. 79
 The Court's sole
focus on accuracy, however, ignores the damaging effects of decision-making by an
official whose institutional role prejudices the individual."
II. PROCEDURAL. DUE PROCESS FOR UNION MEMBERS
A. Slate Court Decisions Before the LMRDA
Congress enacted the LMRDA against a background of state common law concern-
ing the procedural due process rights of union members disciplined by their union. 8 ' In
fact, state courts decided union discipline cases for more than sixty years before the
LMRDA." The state cases show the strong influence of Supreme Court constitutional
due process theory. 88
In developing a common law of union members' procedural due process rights, the
state courts hacito determine the source of the right. Without a statutory source such
as the LMRDA, the state courts found either a property right in union membership or
a contractual right under the union constitution and bylaws, which courts viewed as a
contract between the union and the members or as a contract entered into by all union
members.'^ The courts exercised broad judicial power in order to protect the property
or contract right regardless of the actual terms of the contract." For example, in inter-
preting a union constitution and bylaws under a property rights theory, one court stated
that the requirements of notice of disciplinary charges and a prior hearing "exist[]
independently of any provision to that effect in the organic law of the organization and
citing the "interest in relatively speedy resolution of questions of eligibility," the interest in "dealing
with one another informally," and "burdensome caseloads").
Hortonville ft. School Dist., 426 U.S. at 494-95; Arnett, 416 U.S. at 170 n.5 (Powell and
Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 484 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 298 (1970).
80 See Hortonville ft. School Dist, 426 U.S. at 499 (Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, J.J., dissenting)
('officials 'directly involved in making recommendations cannot always have complete objectivity in
evaluating them,'" (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486 (1972)); Arnett, 416 U.S. at 199
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("here the hearing official [the Regional
Director] was the object of slander that was the basis for the employee's proposed discharge ....
In ruling that the employee was to be terminated, the hearing examiner's own reputation, as well
as the efficiency of the service, was at stake.").
81 Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 Mien. L. REV. 819,
835-36 (1960) [hereinafter Cox, Internal Affairs]; Cox, The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,
72 HARV. L. REV. 609, 613-16 (1959) [hereinafter Cox, Role of Law]; Summers, The Law of Union
Discipline: What the Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 175 (1960).
" Summers, supra note 81, at 175.
" Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81, at 836; Cox, Role of Law, supra note 81, at 616; Summers,
supra note 81, at 201. See infra notes 88-117 and accompanying text.
84 Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81, at 835-36; Cox, Role of Law, supra note 81, at 613-14;
Summers, supra note 81, at 178-80. See, e.g., Local Union No. 57, Bhd. of Painters, Decorators &
Paperhangers of America v, Boyd, 245 Ala. 227, 234, 16 So. 2d 705, 711 (1944); Blek v. Kirkman,
148 Misc. 522, 523, 266 N.Y.S. 91, 92, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1933); Hall v. Morrin, 293 S.W. 425, 439
(Mo. App. 1927); Simpson v. Grand Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 83 W. Va. 355, 365, 98 S.E.
580, 584 (1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919). See also cases cited in Summers, Legal Limitations
on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1052, 1055, 1057 (1951) [hereinafter Summers, Legal
Limitations].
85 Cox, Role of Law, supra note 81, at 613-15; Summers, supra note 81, at 180-82.
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any bylaw which assumes to dispense with notice and hearing is unreasonable and void." 56
Thus, under a contract or property theory, state courts could rewrite union disciplinary
procedures in union constitutions and bylaws."
Before Congress enacted the LMRDA, natural law theory, which dominated Su-
preme Court doctrine during the same period,"" also influenced state court development
of union members' procedural due process rights. While most courts used property or
contract theories to justify the adjudication of procedural safeguards as a matter of
public policy," the explicit application of natural law theory is striking. Professor Sum-
mers has observed that the state courts embraced natural law theory as "a fundamental
principle of near constitutional quality." 99 In so doing \ they used terms similar to the
Supreme Court's language, appealing to moral principles of "natural justice,"" "demands
of fair play,"92 "common decency,"" "good conscience,"94 and the "spirit of the law of
the land."'S State court decisions also parallel the Supreme Court's "fair trial" rule, used
before the Court selectively incorporated specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 96 As
in the fair trial rule, state courts approached the due process issues on a case-by-case
basis in order to determine whether the procedure in general was substantially fair."
Kirkman, 148 Misc. at 523, 366 N.Y.S. at 92.
87 S ummers, supra note 81, at 180-81.
88 See supra text accompanying notes 20-26.
89 Summers, supra note 81, at 180.
w Summers, supra note 81, at 201. Professor Summers described the legal theory as imposing
"a standard of fairness or 'natural justice."' Id. Professor Cox has described five categories of legal
grounds which state courts used to set aside an expulsion from membership, based on the property
or contract theory:
(I) The [disciplinary] procedure violated the union's constitution or by-laws.
(2) The constitution or by-laws did not authorin expulsion for the alleged offense.
(3) The procedure ... did not afford the member a fair hearing.
(4) The expulsion ... was 'unreasonable,' contrary to 'public policy,' or contrary to
'natural justice.'
(5) The expulsion was in bad faith because the purported ground was only a pretense
for getting rid of a troublesome member.
Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81, at 835-36.
91 Blck v. Wilson, 145 Misc. 373, 377, 259 N.Y. Supp, 443, 448 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1932), rev'd on
other grounds, 262 N.Y. 253, 185 N.E. 692 (1933). See also Local Union No. 57, 245 Ala. at 236, 16
So. 2d at 713 ("fundamental principles of right and justice"); Taylor v. Favorito, 74 N.E.2d 768,
772 (Ohio App. 1947) ("natural justice"); Becker v. Calnan, 313 Mass. 625, 628, 48 N.E.2d 668,
670 (1943) ("principles of natural justice"); McGinley v. Milk Sc Ice Cream Salesmen, Drivers &
Dairy Employees Local Union No. 205, 351 Pa. 47, 52, 40 A.2d 16, 18 (1944) ("contrary to law and
justice"); Cohen v. Rosenberg, 262 App. Div. 274, 276, 27 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941),
aff'd, 287 N.Y. 800 (1942) (courts.will interfere "IwIhere there has been an injustice perpetrated").
See also cases cited in Summers, supra note 81, at 200-07; Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note
84, at 1075, 1081, 1082.
" Bricklayers', Plasterers' and Stonemasons' Union v. Bowen, 183 N.Y. 855, 859 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1920), aff'd mem., 198 App. Div. 967, 189 N.Y. 938 (1921).
93 Hall, 293 S.W. at 440 (Mo. App. 1927); Simpson, 83 W.Va. at 373, 98 S.E. at 587 ("bounds of
reason, common sense, or fairness"). See also cases cited in Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note
84, at 1081, 1083.
" Bricklayers' Union, 183 N.Y. Supp. at 861.
"3 Id, at 859.
"" See supra notes 20-33 and accompanying text.
n Summers, supra note 81, at 201.
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The state courts' description of the union context and disciplinary structure in terms
parallel to the government's relationship to its citizens also evidences the constitutional
analogy. Thus, just as citizens have property rights which the government cannot deny
without due process of law, state courts held that union members possess property rights
to union membership and jobs controlled by unions which implicate due process con-
cerns." Some courts described union disciplinary proceedings as judicial or quasi-judi-
cia1.99
 Furthermore, state courts also applied criminal law concepts to union disciplinary
proceedings, including the presumption of innocence" and the principle of strict con-
struction of statutory offenses.'th
In deciding specific due process issues, natural law concepts often provide the
foundation for state court protection of procedural rights. Some decisions adopt the
basic principle of natural law theory that an individual's rights exist independent of
positive law." The concept of pre-existing rights underlies state court willingness to
protect procedural rights not explicitly provided in the union constitution or that conflict
with other union regulations."
Similar to the Supreme Court's use of natural law theory, state courts required that
unions provide procedures which the courts assumed were essential to a fair hearing. 104
As a New Jersey court stated, a union's quasi-judicial procedures should accord with
traditional due process notions." Applying natural law theory to define the procedures
necessary to satisfy due process requirements, this court stated that "natural justice"
requires that the union provide an individual with notice, a hearing, and an opportunity
to present defenses before discipline." Other courts accepted this general outline of
procedural due process rights and addressed additional procedural issues. These courts
have held that union members have the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
during a disciplinary hearing." Generally, state courts have also held that unions may
deny the right to counsel outside the membership, so long as overall fairness is main-
tained by denying this right to the charging party as well."
" Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81, at 835; Summers, supra note 81, at 178; Taylor, 74 N.E.2d
at 772 (Ohio App. 1947); Local Union No. 57, 245 Ala. at 234-35, 16 So. 2d at 711. See also cases
cited in Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 84, at 1055, 1075.
99 Taylor, 74 N.E.2d at 772 (Ohio App. 1947) (quoting Dragwa v. Federal Labor Union, 136
N.J. Eq. 172, 41 A.2d 32 (1945)); Simpson, 83 W. Va. at 365, 98 S.E. at 584. See also cases cited in
Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 84, at 1055, 1081.
RAI McGinley, 351 Pa, at 52, 40 A.2d at 18 (1944); Schmidt v. Rosenberg, 49 N.Y.S.2d 364, 366
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944). See also cases cited in Summers, supra note 81, at 184; Summers, Legal
Limitations, supra note 84, at 1064, 1081.
10 ' Summers, supra note 81, at 184 n.51.
1" See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
1" Summers, supra note 81, at 201; Local Union No. 37, 245 Ala. at 234, 16 So. 2d at 711;
Kirkman, 148 Misc. at 523; Bricklayers' Union, 183 N.Y. Supp. at 859. See also cases cited in Summers,
supra note 81, at 181; Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 84, at 1055, 1057, 1060.
1 °' Summers, supra note 81, at 201.
Dragwa, 136 N.J. Eq. at 174-75, 41 A.2d at 34 (1945) (quoted in Taylor, 74 N.E.2d at 772).
See also Coleman v. O'Leary, 58 N.Y.S.2d 812, 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), appeal dism'd, 269 App. Div. 972,
58 N.Y.S.2d 358 (1945); Brooks v. Engar, 259 App. Div. 333, 334, 19 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (1st Dep't.
1940), appeal dism'd, 284 N.Y. 763, 31 N.E.2d 514 (1940). See also cases cited in Summers, supra note
81, at 182, 201, 203; Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 84, at 1060, 1065, 1075, 1081.
1 " Dragwa, 136 N.J. Eq. at 174, 41 A.2d at 34.
107
 See Summers, supra note 81, at 202-06; Shernoff v. Schimel, 28 L.R.R.M. 2377, 2378 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1951); Shapiro v. Gehlman, 244 App. Div. 238, 242-43, 278 N.Y. Supp. 785, 790 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1935). See also cases cited in Summers, supra note 81, at 201, 203.
1 " Summers, supra note 81, at 202-03. This approach parallels the Supreme Court application
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Another form of due process which state courts have considered is the requirement
that unions may impose discipline only for offenses written in the union constitution or
bylaws. 10° Courts have used this requirement to invalidate discipline for offenses not
explicitly stated in the constitution or bylaws."° This due process protection also broad-
ened judicial discretion to decide whether written provisions in union constitutions and
bylaws included the offense for which a member was charged. State courts often inter-
preted the provisions strictly and overruled the union's attempt to read their constitu-
tional provisions to include the alleged offense.'" Such use of judicial discretion, espe-
cially when combined with judicial review of the evidence, involved the courts in the
merits of the case and gave state courts broad control over the outcome of disciplinary
proceedings.' 12
State courts have also held that union members have the right to an impartial
hearing." 3 Again, the courts applied natural law principles, as illustrated in one case:
"Pjf course common decency, to say nothing of the jealous eye of the law, would demand
that the hearing or trial be an impartial one and that no bad faith be shown."" 4 While
state courts have invalidated union discipline imposed by a biased tribunal, Professor
Summers has described the impartiality issue as the weakest point of judicial protec-
tion, 13 because of union tribunals', inherent bias in cases arising out of factional dis-
putes." 0 The problem may also stem from an inherent bias in any internal union tribunal
that considers a disciplinary matter."'
State courts generally did not apply the utilitarian theory of later Supreme Court
due process cases, which balanced opposing interests to reach the instrumentalist goal
of the "fair trial" rule to the issue of the constitutional right to counsel in state criminal trials, where
the Court judged the due process allegation "by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case"
to determine whether a procedure denied "fundamental fairness." Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
462 (1942),
162 Summers, supra note 81, at 181-82.
LID Coleman, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 817; Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 282, 177 N.E. 833, 834 (1931).
See also cases cited in Summers, supra note 81, at 181-82.
• "' Summers, supra note 81, at 182-84; McGinley, 351 Pa. at 52, 40 A.2d at 18,
"2 Summers, supra note 81, at 182-85; McGinley, 351 Pa. at 57, 40 A.2d at 20 (Stern, J.,
dissenting).	 •
113 Cox, Role of Law, supra note 81, at 834; Summers, supra note 81, at 204-06.
114 Hall, 293 S.W. at 440 (hearing was not 1pised, although one member of the General Executive
Board which judged the case had filed the charges and two other members were alleged to have
been defamed by the plaintiff); see also Coleman, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 816 (impartial hearing denied
where two members of the trial board were also witnesses and prosecutors); Becker, 313 Mass. at
629-30, 48 N.E.2d at 671 (1943) (impartial hearing not denied although a member of the lower
tribunal sat on the appeal of the case in a higher tribunal); Cohen, 262 App. Div. at 275, 27 N.Y.S.2d
at 836 (impartial hearing denied where trial board members had a direct interest in the case, as
they had been elected in the union election challenged by the plaintiff }; Gaestel v. Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators* Paperhangers, 120 N.J. Eq. 358, 363, 185 A. 36, 38-39 (Ch. 1936) (impartial
hearing denied where the union district council proferred the charges and sat as the jury), See also
cases cited in Summers, supra note 81, at 204; Summers, Legal Limitations, supra note 84, at 1082,
1083.
115 Summers, supra note 81, at 206.
" 6 Id, Professor Summers, however, also states that in general state "courts closely scrutinize
union disciplinary proceedings to protect against procedural unfairness. Although the strictness of
the standard may vary, ... the variance is probably not greater than that practiced in criminal cases
in the same courts." Id.
11 ' Id. at 204.
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of accuracy in administrative proceedings." 5 State courts also did not express the utili-
tarian goal of achieving union democracy by balancing the interests of unions and union
members, specifically in the collective bargaining context, as did federal courts after the
LMRDA's passage. "9 Rather, state court decisions show the prevailing influence of the
natural law theory which dominated Supreme Court doctrine at that time. Many state
court decisions do not consider interest balancing at al1. 120
 Furthermore, even decisions
that identify countervailing interests only express a concern with maintaining the auton-
omy of private organizations when it conflicts with union members' individual rights or
their right to earn a livelihood. 121 Concern for organizational autonomy may have had
its strongest influence in judicial reluctance to find a violation of the right to an impartial.
hearing without direct proof of bias.' 22 One court held that a union member received a
fair trial despite the presence of interested parties on the hearing board and noted that
a finding of bias would have disqualified the only body within the union's organizational
structure with original jurisdiction to try the case.'"
B. Legislative History of the LMRDA
Title I of the LMRDA, the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations,
includes procedural due process rights for union members.' 24
 Section I01(a)(5) requires
notice of disciplinary charges, a reasonable time to prepare a defense, and a full and
fair hearing prior to any imposition of discipline on the union member. 125 The move
from a judicially created right to a statutory right to proCedural due process raises the
19 See supra text accompanying notes 51-80.
"9 See supra text accompanying notes 187-220.
12° See, e.g., Madden v. Atkins, 4 App. Div. 2d 1, 162 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1957), aff 'd in relevant part,
4 N.Y.2d 283, 151 N.E.2d 73 (1958); Taylor, 74 N.E.2d 768; McGinley, 351 Pa. 47, 40 A.2d 16;
Schmidt, 49 N,Y.S.2d 364; Gaestel, 120 N.J. Eq. 358, 185 A. 36; Kirkman, 148 Misc. 522, 266 N.Y.Supp.
91; Hall, 293 S.W. 435.
121
 See, e.g., Coleman, 58 N.Y.S.2d at 817; Local Union No. 57, 245 Ala. at 239, 16 So. 2d at 711;
Becker, 313 Mass. at 631, 48 N.E.2d at 672; Cohen, 262 App. Div. at 275-76, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 836;
Bricklayers' Union, 183 N.Y.S. at 858-59; Simpson, 83 W. Va. 355, 98 S.E. at 587. The general nature
of the expression of conflicting interests is consistent with the state court development of union
members' due process rights in the context of members' rights in other private organizations. See
Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81, at 835; Cox, Role of Law, supra note 81, at 613.
122 Summers, supra note 81, at 205-06. Professor Summers notes, however, that in cases lacking
direct proof of bias, the courts "often make some rough compensation for that which they feel but
can not find." Id. at 206.
1 ' 9 Hall, 293 S.W. at 440. But see Summers, supra note 81, at 205 (quoting Madden, 9 App. Div.
2d at 19, 162 N.Y.S.2d at 593) where the court found that "[t]he fact that there were no members
of the board who could qualify as disinterested judges is irrelevant. If there was a problem as to
how to provide an impartial tribunal for these cases the burden of its solution was [the union's]."
Id.
124 29 U.S.C. §§ 411, 412, 413, 414, 415 (1982). The statute will hereafter be referred to by the
relevant section of Title I.
L25 Section 101(a)(5) states:
(5) Safeguards Against Improper Disciplinary Act. — No member of any labor
organization may be fined, suspended, expelled, or otherwise disciplined except for
nonpayment of dues by such organization or by any officer thereof unless such member
has been (A) served with specific written charges; (B) given a reasonable time to
prepare his defense; (C) afforded a full and fair hearing.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1982).
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issue of whether Congress, like state courts, relied on a constitutional analogy when it
established union member rights. Similarities in the organizational structure and function
of unions and government may support legislation of' parallel rights and obligations.
Once courts find these structural similarities, they may develop the content of constitu-
tional due process theory.
The LM RDA's unusual legislative path complicates the search for the congressional
intent underlying Title 1. ,2° Senate Bill 1555, reported out of the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare, regulated internal union affairs in order to ensure union
democracy' 27 but did not contain the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations. 128
In the House of Representatives, H.R. 8342, reported out of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, contained provisions for union members' individual rights which
differed substantially from the final version of Title I of the LMRDA. 129 The addition
of Title I resulted from a series of amendments and substitute amendments to the bills
reported out of the congressional committees.isu As a consequence, the congressional
126 For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the Bill of Rights for union members,
see Rothman, Legislative History of the "Bill of Rights" for Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1960).
See alto Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851
(1960); Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81.
127 S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958) (quoted in Rothman, supra note 126, at 204).
The goal of ensuring union democracy was reiterated in the Senate Labor Committee Report
accompanying S. 1555. S. REF. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 2318, 2318, reprinted in I LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIIE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPotur-
[Pm AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959 398 [hereinafter I LEG. HIST]. The McClellan Committee
recommended legislation for this purpose in 1958, based on its investigations into abuses by union
officials.
128 Rothman, supra note 126, at 206. S. 1555 included financial reporting and disclosure pro-
visions, regulations of trusteeships and internal union elections, and provisions encouraging vol-
untary adoption of ethical practice codes by unions and employers of ethical practices. S. 1555,
86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1 LEG. HIST. 338-396.
In 1958, the Senate passed S. 3974, the Kennedy-Ives Bill, which, like S. 1555, regulated
internal union affairs without a bill of rights for union members. The House, however, did not
pass the bill. In 1959, the Kennedy-Ervin bill was introduced as S. 505, and was reported out of
the Senate Labor Committee as S. 1555. Rothman, supra note 126, at 204-05.
129 H. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 2424-75, reprinted in 1 LEG. His.r. 759-864. The differences between Title 1 of H.R. 8342
and Title 1 of the LMRDA included:
(1) H.R. 8342 did not contain an "Equal Rights" provision. Instead, Section 101(a)(1) provided
that all members shall be accorded "all the rights and privileges pertaining to membership ...."
(2) As constructed, Section l0l(a)(2) of H.R. 8342 did not clearly protect speech outside the
union hall. (See also Rothman, supra note 126, at 211, regarding discussion of this problem in the
Senate debate).
(3) The protection of the right to sue in Section 101(a)(4) of H.R. 8342 did not provide for a
maximum time limit for the internal union exhaustion requirement.
(4) The due process protections of Section 101(a)(5) of H.R. 8342 were more general than the
corresponding section of the LMRDA and were afforded only :titer the union imposed discipline,
and provided for "a fair hearing on written charges and bylaws of such labor organization."
H.R. 8342, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1 LEG. Hts. r., at 696-700; Rothman, supra note
126, at 207-08.
no In the Senate, Senator McClellan introduced S. 1137, including his version of a bill of rights
for union members, after the subcommittee hearings on the Kennedy-Ervin bill ended. Although
the Senate subcommittee reconvened to hear Senator McClellan's testimony on the bill, S. 1555 was
reported by the Senate Labor Committee without a bill of rights. Following the committee report,
the Senate approved Senator McClellan's version of the union members' bill of rights, offered as
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committee reports provide little evidence of the motivations behind Tide I's passage.' 3 '
Therefore, the major source for determining congressional intent is the floor debates
that occurred when the Senate and House considered the Title I amendments and
substitute amendments. 132
During the Senate debate Senator McClellan, who introduced the initial bill of rights
amendment to Senate Bill 1555,'" analogized the individual rights of union members
to the constitutional rights of United States citizens. Senator McClellan, noting that the
Constitution does not exclude union members, stated that the bill of rights for union
members would help ensure that union members would enjoy some of the freedoms
guaranteed to citizens under the United States Constitution.' 34
 The Senator extended
the political analogy and cited governmental support of unions to justify the legislation
of individual civil rights within the union. He argued that the federal government grants
unions tremendous power and should, therefore, compel the unions to advance demo-
cratic principles.'"
an amendment to S. 1555. The Senator's version of Title I, however, was changed by a substitute
amendment introduced by Senator Kuchel and approved by the Senate. Rothman, supra note 126,
at 205-07.
In the House of Representatives the Landrum-Griffin Bill was substituted for H.R. 8342.
Rothrnn, supra note 126, at 208. Tide I of the Landrum-Griffin Bill is the same as Title I of the
final version ()lithe LMRDA, with some minor punctuation differences in Sections 101(a)(1) and
101(a)(5). H.R. 8400, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted at 1 LEG. HIST. 619-686, at 628-31.
131 Rothman, supra note 126, at 208-09.
132 Id. at 209. Although Professor Rothman states that "almost all of the pertinent discussion
[of the Bill of Rights] was on the floor of the Senate," id., the House floor debate of Title 1 does
include statements relevant to the constitutional analogy. See id. See also infra notes 141-148, 152,
156-57 and accompanying text.
While controversy exists over the use of legislative history, "the following are considered the
most reliable components of legislative history in the interpretation of statutes:
Committee reports
Statements [during floor debate] of legislators who sponsored the bill or who chaired committees
that favorably considered it
Studies, reports, and messages of bodies that initially proposed the bill." W.P. STArsxv, LEG-
ISLATIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 109 (2d ed. 1984). See also id. at 103-19.
133 See supra note 130.
134 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF
1959 1098 [hereinafter 2 LEG. 1-11s -r.] (The bill of rights "would bring to the conduct of union
affairs and to union members the reality of some of the freedoms from oppression that we enjoy
as citizens by virtue of the Constitution of the United States.").
133 Id. To a great extent, the "basic rights" which Senator McClellan enumerated in his proposed
version of Title I are the same as those in the final draft of Title I of the LMRDA. One major
difference is Senator McClellan's provision that the statute require that union charters include all
the rights guaranteed to members by Title I. Senator McClellan's version of Title I also differed
from the final bill in that it did not provide that union members' rights may be limited by reasonable
union rules governing areas such as the conduct of meetings. Senator McClellan's provisions for
"Safeguards Against Improper Disciplinary Action" were identical to the final version of § 101(a)(5)
in requiring the union member to be "served with written specific charges," to be "given a reasonable
time to prepare his defense," and to be "afforded a full and fair hearing" prior to imposition of
any discipline. The important differences from § 101(a)(5), however, include Senator McClellan's
requirement that discipline may be imposed only for "breach of some published written [union]
rule" and that union members must be afforded an appeal before "an impartial person or persons
... agreed to by [the union] and the accused, or ... designated by an independent arbitration or
mediation association or board." This appellate procedure also included requiring a written tran-
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Senator Kuchel's substitute amendment for Senator McClellan's bill of rights was
virtually identical to the final version of Title I. 136 The final version deleted from the
McClellan bill explicit provisions for a union member's appeal front disciplinary action
to an impartial reviewer.'" In explaining this change, Senator Kuchel also drew an
analogy between constitutional rights and an individual union member's rights. He stated
that explicit safeguards were cumbersome and unnecessary because the courts will be
able to determine whether a union member had "constitutionally reasonable notice and
a reasonable hearing." 138
The House of Representatives passed the Landrum-Griffin Bill as an amendment
to the House committee bill." Title I of the Landrum-Griffin Bill is identical to the
final statute.'4° Congressman Landrum also drew a constitutional analogy during the
congressional floor debate when he discussed Title I. He noted that all Americans,
regardless of union affiliation, enjoy the rights contained in the LMRDA's bill of rights
because they are substantially the same as those contained in the Constitution's Bill of
Rights; the LMRDA, therefore, merely extends existing rights in a new environment."'
Congressman Griffin argued for extending constitutional rights to internal union pro-
cesses and quoted Senator McClellan's statement that "Where is no reason why a union
[member] should be required to leave the rights guaranteed ... by the Constitution of
the United States at the door when he [or she] goes into a union meeting. "142
Earlier in the House debate, Congressman Teller discussed the parallels between
individual constitutional rights and the individual rights of union members. Although
he agreed in general with the analogy, he expressed reservations about its absolute
application in the union setting." 3 Congressman Teller cited the "unique nature of the
script of the hearing. S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); reprinted at 1 LEG. HIST. at 267-71. For
a discussion of these and other differences, see Rothman, supra note 126, at 207, 209-16.
155 See 2 LEG. HIST. at 1220-21. For a discussion of specific provisions of the Kuchei amendment
as compared with the McClellan amendment and the final version of the LMRDA, see Rothman,
supra note 126, at 206-07, 209-16.
157 The McClellan amendment provided that the member subject to discipline must be "afforded
final review on a written transcript of the hearing, by an impartial person or persons (1) agreed to
by such organization and the accused, or (ii) designated by an independent, arbitration or mediation
association or board." S. 1137, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), § 101(a)(7)(E); reprinted at 1 LEG. firsr.
270.
'" 2 LEG. HIST. 1232. See also Rothman, supra note 126, at 216. Senator Goldwater also created
a constitutional analogy when he stated that the Senate was "in very much the same position" as
the "Founding Fathers," who wrote the Bill of Rights because:
In the future ... people may not recognize the rights they have .... In the past 50
years laws have been written to protect the rights of the working people of the United
States. Now we have reached a point where we need to spell out those rights and
incorporate them in what we may call a bill of rights.
2 LEG. HIST. 5822-23.
159 See supra note 130.
14D The only differences are minor punctuation changes in $§ 101(a)(1) and 101(a)(5). See supra
note 130.
141 2 LEG. HIST. 1645.
142 Id. at 1566. Congressman Griffin also stated that the "basic guarantees tof the union mem-
bers' bill of rights) are hardly new or novel — they are the essential and fundamental rights which
every American citizen is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights of the Federal Constitution." Id.
143 2 LEG. HIST. 1434 ("I have heard it said often that a union member should have the same
right of free speech and other democratic rights in his union as an American has in his relation to
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collective bargaining process"'" as the basis for his reservation regarding a true analogy
between constitutional and union members' rights, for in collective bargaining the union
may have to suppress some internal dissent in order to reach a settlement. "5
In addition to the debate directly concerning the bill of rights, congressional justi-
fications for internal union regulation provide support for a constitutional analogy. The
congressional committee reports stress the public interest in union democracy created
by the union's role as exclusive bargaining representative.'" The Senate Labor Com-
mittee's Report found that the union's control over their economic welfare gives "union
members ... a vital interest ... in the policies and conduct of union affairs." 17 Requiring
the union to follow democratic procedures, therefore, would allow the individual mem-
ber to participate in formulating union policies.'"
Congress's second justification for enacting the LMRDA focused on the empower-
ment of unions by the federal government.'" The federal government authorized and
enforced the exclusivity principle under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and
the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 159 Thus, the Senate Labor Committee Report noted that
because the government grants labor unions the authority to act as exclusive bargaining
representatives, government must ensure that unions use this power solely for the benefit
of workers and not for personal gain.'"
Congress's concern with governmental empowerment of unions supports a view of
unions as quasi-public organizations, with judicial or quasi-judicial internal proceedings,
as described by the state courts. 152 While not sufficient to constitute the state action
his government. I agree with the spirit of the analogy but 1 doubt it can be applied with inexorable
precision.").
' 44 Id.
15 Congressman 'Feller stated that "if the loud mouth, the subversive, or the neurotic were
allowed to call the tune . . . in the working out of fair collective bargaining settlements, the resulting
industrial strife might well cause recurring crises in our economy." More generally, Congressman
Teller cautioned that democratic principles must be accommodated in the collective bargaining
process. Id. In his view, strictly applying democratic rights within the union could affect adversely
the American labor movement which currently functions as "a dam against much more pervasive
radicalism," Id.
146 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. Com CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2323:
"7 Id.
1" Id. The House Labor Committee's Report also focused on this aspect of the union's repre-
sentational role and referred generally to the need for democratic "practices and procedures" as
well as for the protection of "basic rights of union members and employees represented by the
union." H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2429, I LEG. His.r. 765.
149 This justification formed the basis for the election provisions and regulation against "rack-
eteering, corruption, and conflicts of interest." S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in
1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2328.
15° See National Labor Relations Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 159(a) (1982); Railway Labor
Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1982).
151 S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2331. The House Labor Committee Report echoed this view, stating that "if unions are to enjoy
the protection of rights and exercise the broad powers which are guaranteed to them by the
National Labor Relations Act and the Railway Labor Act, they ought also be held responsible for
abuses that have accompanied the exercise of such powers and rights by some union leaders." H.R.
REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2430; 1
LEG. His-r. 766.
' 52 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Professor Klare observes that courts treat unions
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required to bind a private party to constitutional obligations, the quasi-public status
created by governmental involvement in unions does justify a constitutional analog -y.'"
The parallels between political representative bodies and the public interest in the union's
representative function further support the union's quasi-public status.' 54 The public
interest could be protected by ensuring democratic constitutional rights in addition to
democratic elections. During the House debate Congressman Arends relied on the
parallels between political and union representation to argue in favor of applying to
unions the democratic principles underlying government processes in order to protect
a worker's basic rights.'" Congressman Arends directly compared the representative
structures and argued that the election procedures for union officials should be as
democratic as the election procedures for the House of Representatives.'"
Advocates of a statutory bill of rights for union members also noted the structural
and functional similarities of unions and governmental institutions and the resulting
as "quasi-public entities," "by virtue of [the unions] power, function, and legal authority." Klare,
The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1358, 1372 (1982) [hereinafter Klare,
Public/Private Distinction].
'" Congressman Landrum and Senator McClellan focused on the governmental empowerment
of unions to justify the union members' bill of rights. Congressman Landrum quoted Senator
McClellan:
In the words of the senior Senator from Arkansas:
"Since extraordinary powers of industrial government are granted to unions, and
protected by Federal law, it is entirely appropriate that the Federal government insure
that those union members' rights and personal freedoms contained in the Bill of
Rights of our Federal Constitution will not be willfully violated by force."
2 LEG. HIFI'. 1557. For an argument against finding sufficient state action to apply constitutional
obligations to unions, see Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union, and"Covernmental Action," 70
YALE. Lj. 345 (1961).
154 Professor Cox has stated:
In retrospect, it seems plain that the enactment of the LMRDA became inevitable
when Congress, by enacting the Wagner Act transported the political principle of
majority rule into labor-management relations by giving the union designated by the
majority the exclusive right to represent all the employees in an appropriate bargaining
unit.
Cox, Internal Affairs, supra note 81, at 819. See also id. at 830 (describing the union's "quasi-legislative
power to bind employees in the bargaining unit without their consent"); Summers, The Public Interest
in Union Democracy, 53 N.W. U.L. REv. 610, 624 (1958) [hereinafter Summers, Public Interest]
("[Ulnions have no real analogue in any other private group . . .. Their power to legislate concerning
industrial affairs, reinforced by legal protection and government authorization, is compulsory in
character, binding workers together whether they choose to be bound or not.").
'" 2 LEG. f•tsT. 1633.
"6 Id. Congressman Arends continued: "And should there not be the the same right of the
individual workingman to require an accounting of the stewardship of his elected officials over his
interests as is required of us as elected officials?" Id. See also Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323
U.S. 192, 202 (1944), where the Court used a constitutional and legislative analogy as the basis for
the union's duty of fair representation:
[T]he Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative ... at least as
exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members ... as the Constitution
imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom
it legislates. Congress has seen lit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers
comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the
rights of those whom it represents.
Id.
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need for union democracy. In 1952, Professor Summers, writing for the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), described the representative function of the union as follows:
The union in bargaining, helps make laws; in processing grievances acts to
enforce those laws; and in settling grievances helps interpret and apply those
laws. It is the worker's economic legislature, police [officer], and judge. The
union, in short, is the worker's industrial government. The union's power is
the power to govern the working lives of those for whom it bargains, and
like all governing power should be exercised democratically.'"
Professor Summers extended the political analogy and characterized the worker as a
citizen of the union who should enjoy the right to participate freely in the processes of
self-government.'" In its statement before the House Education and Labor Committee
in 1959, the ACLU tied governmentally enforced union power in collective bargaining
to the need for unions to guarantee members' basic democratic rights "akin to those the
Government must recognize generally — rights of free speech, fair procedure and non-
discrimination."'"
The constitutional analogies made by members of Congress during their debate of
Title I do not reflect explicitly the theoretical content courts must apply when inter-
preting the union members' bill of rights. Some senators expressed natural law concepts
during the debate, such as Senator McClellan's argument that union members have
inherent constitutional rights.'" Senator McClellan stated that the Title 1 rights are basic:
"They ought to be basic to every person, and they are, under the Constitution of the
United States." 161 Senator Allott, supporting this position, stated that union members
needed the bill of rights because "our legal processes have broken down in respect to
enforcement of the rights which human beings are guaranteed, not only by the Consti-
tution of the United States, but which I personally believe every human being is guar-
anteed by God. "162
The shift from judicially created rights to legislated rights for union members
necessarily brings utilitarianism into focus. Critics of the Supreme Court's use of utili-
tarian theory to interpret constitutional rights have described utilitarian interest balanc-
I " AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 4 ( June 1952). The Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was active in calling for a bill of rights for union members both
in voluntary actions by unions and in federal legislation. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION ON PROPOSED LEGISLATION TO PROTECT
INTERNAL RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS — S. 1555, H.R. 4473, H.R. 3028, AND H.R. 7265 —
SUBMITTED TO THE HOUSE EDUCATION AND LABOR COMMITTEE ( June 1959) [hereinafter PROPOSED
LEGISLATION]; AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, A LABOR UNION "BILL OF RIGHTS" — DEMOCRACY
IN LABOR UNIONS — THE KENNEDY-IVES RILL (Sept. 1958); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS ( June 1952); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN
TRADE UNIONS (1949); AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS (1943);
See also Rothman, supra note 126, at 201-03 (tracing the ACLU's history in proposing a bill of rights
for union members).
Professor Summers has focused on the unions' legislative function in other publications. See
Summers, Public Interest, supra note 154, at 624; Summers, Union Powers and Workers' Rights, 49
Mici-1, L. REV. 805, 820 (1951) [hereinafter Summers, Union Powers].
158 AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DEMOCRACY IN TRADE UNIONS 5 ( June 1952).
"Y. PROPOSED LEGISLATION, supra note 157, at 1.
160 2 LEG. HIST. 1103.
161 Id. at 1105.
162 Id. at 1114.
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ing as best suited for legislative rather than judicial processes.'" Unlike the state court
development of union members' rights, 184 Congress explicitly described the opposing
interests which must be balanced in order to achieve the goal of union democracy. The
Senate Labor Committee Report recognized as basic principles the union's need for
institutional autonomy with "minimum interference by government,"'" as well as the
individual's interest in "minimum democratic safeguards."'" These interests represent
the conflict between preserving union internal control as a private organization and
governmental protection of the individual's public democratic rights.
Title I provisions for "Equal Rights," 167 "Freedom of Speech and Assembly," 16" and
"Protection of the Right to Sue" 169 also reflect utilitarian interest balancing. These pro-
visions explicitly recognize the opposing interests by protecting the individual's demo-
cratic rights and, by including a provision establishing the union's right to enforce
reasonable rules.'" Interpreting the Section 101(a)(2) right to free speech and the
reasonable rule provision, the Supreme Court identified the constitutional analogy and
stated that the "[legislative] history reveals that Congress modeled Title I after the Bill
of Rights, and that the legislators intended § 101(a)(2) to restate a principal First Amend-
ment value.""' The Court, however, found that the reasonable rules provision refuted
the argument that Section 101(a)(2)'s scope is coextensive with first amendment protec-
tions."2
Legislative history, therefore, provides evidence of congressional intent to draft the
Title I Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations as a legislative analogy to the
Constitution's Bill of' Rights. Governmental support of unions, union power over the
162 See supra note 50.
164 See supra text accompanying notes 118-123.
1 " S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE COlqG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2323; 1 LEG. H isr. 403. ("[IIn establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be
taken not to undermine union self-government or weaken unions in their role as collective bar-
gaining agents.").
' 66 Id.
167 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(I) (1982).
168 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2) (1982).
Is" 29 U.S.C. § 4 1 1(a)(4) (1982).
1" The provisions protect the unions' institutional interests: In 101(a)(1), the union's ability
to reasonably regulate nominations, voting, and meetings procedures; in § 10100(2), reasonable
regulation of speech affecting "the organization as an institution" and "performance of [the union's]
legal or contractual obligations"; in § 101(a)(4), the union's ability to require exhaustion of internal
union appeals for a maximum of Four months. See also, Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the
Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARI/. L. REV. 727, 729 (1969) ("The generality of the language [of the
10I(a)(5) full and fair hearing requirement] is the result of an incompletely resolved compromise
between extreme positions of extensive and minimum interjection of federal power into the internal
operations of unions").
Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 1 I 1 (1982); see also Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 931,
435 (1982) (Title I was "aimed at enlarged protection for members of unions paralleling certain
rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution").
172 Sadlowski, 457 U.S. at I 1 1. The Court found proof of congressional intent in the statutory
"reasonableness" requirement rather than the first amendment strict scrutiny standard. Id.
Federal and state courts have held that § 101(0(2) provides broader protection than the first
amendment against discipline for defamatory speech. See, e.g., Nix v. Fulton Lodge No. 2, iAM,
83 L.R.R.M. 2478, 2480 (N.D. Ga. 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1024 (1973); Salzhandler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 449-51 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 946
(1963); Farnum v. Kurtz, 72 L.R.R.M. 2794, 2794 (Ca. Super. Ct. 1969).
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members' economic welfare, as well as structural and functional similarities between
unions and governmental institutions supported the view that unions are quasi-public.
The legislative history, however, does not provide clear evidence of theoretical content
for judicial interpretation of Title I. The Senate floor debate contains some evidence of
a natural law foundation for extending democratic political rights to union members.
The explicit interest balancing in the congressional reports and Title I provisions, how-
ever, demonstrates a stronger competing influence of utilitarian theory.
C. Federal Court Interpretations of the LMRDA
Federal judicial development of the LMRDA's Section 101(a)(5) 173 shows the contin-
ued influence of constitutional due process theory. The federal judiciary's partial reliance
on state court experience in determining the procedural due process rights of union
members 174
 reflects the importance of the natural law theory prevalent in Supreme
Court doctrine before the LMRDA.' 75 The federal judiciary, however, has been influ-
enced primarily by utilitarian theory both as expressed in the LMRDA's legislative history
and as the dominant constitutional theory applied by the Supreme Court in administra-
tive due process cases.
As in the state courts, federal judicial interpretation of Section 101(a)(5) has alluded
to a constitutional analogy. The federal courts have stated that "the elements of ... a
'fair hearing' often resemble constitutional due process requirements," 176 and that "the
fundamental and traditional concepts of due process do apply to the union disciplinary
hearing."'" Furthermore, as in the legislative history, the courts have drawn parallels
between union institutional structures and governmental processes in order to justify
the constitutional analogy. The Supreme Court has explicitly made this comparison,
stating that the LMRDA Title IV election provisions and the Title I "Bill of Rights"
reflect Congress's concern with protecting union members' right "to participate fully in
in
 For discussions of judicial interpretation of 10I(a)(5), see generally Beaird & Player, Union
Discipline of Its Membership Under Section 104(1)(5) of Landrum-Griffin: What is "Discipline" and How
Much Process is Due?, 9 GA. L. REV. 383 (1975); Christensen, Union Discipline Under Federal Law:
Institutional Dilemmas in an Industrial Democracy, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (1968); Etelson & Smith,
supra note 170; Note, Facial Adjudication of Disciplinary Provisions in Union Constitutions, 91 YALET.J.
144 (1981) thereinafter Note, Facial Adjudication]; Note, Substantive and Procedural Due Process in
Union Disciplinary Proceedings, 3 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 389 (1969) [hereinafter Note, Substantive and
Procedural Due Process]; Note, Free Speech, Fair Trials, and Factionalism in Union Discipline, 73 YALE
L.J. 472 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Free Speech].
174 The LMRDA does not pre-empt the state court and legislative regulation in the area of due
process and other individual rights of union members. 29 U.S.C. § 413 ("Nothing contained in
[Title I] shall limit the rights and remedies of any member of a labor organization under any State
or Federal law or before any court or other tribunal."). For statements concerning the influence of
state common law on the enactment of § 101(a)(5) and on federal interpretation of § 101(a)(5), see
Falcone v. Dantinne, 420 F.2d 1157, 1165 (3d Cir. 1969); Parks v. IBEW, 324 F.2d 886, 903-04
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 976 (1963); Gleason v. Chain Serv. Restaurant, 300 F. Supp. 1241.
1251 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff 'd, 422 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1970).
'75 See supra text accompanying notes 88-117. Parks, 314 F.2d at 903-04 (influence on federal
judiciary of state court decisions, including natural law concepts).
"5
 Parks, 314 F.2d at 912 (including notice, opportunity to be heard, right to confrontation,
and impartial judge); see also Falcone, 420 F.2d at 1165.
i77 Tincher v. Piasecki, 520 F.2d 851, 854 (7th Cir. 1975).
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the operation of their union through processes of democratic self-government."'" The
Court also stated that Congress modeled democratic union elections on elections for
political office in government. 09
The judiciary has refined the analogy between the democratic rights of citizens and
union members by analyzing different types of interactions between government and its
citizens. In particular, federal courts have determined the scope of union members'
procedural due process rights by comparing union disciplinary hearings to other adju-
dicative settings."° While federal courts occasionally have applied criminal trial clue
process concepts such as the presumption of innocence"' and issues concerning the
disciplinary sentence,'" most courts have held that "the full panoply of procedural
safeguards in criminal proceedings" is not required."' Rather, some federal courts have
compared federal administrative proceedings in order to judge procedural issues in
union disciplinary hearings.' Applying this comparative approach, courts have de-
scribed judicial review standards according to the nature of the institution. Given the
private character of union disciplinary proceedings, one federal court has assigned the
broadest scope of judicial review to criminal proceedings, a narrower "supervisory role"
over administrative hearings, with the most limited judicial review of disciplinary pro-
ceedings. 185
The content of the procedural due process theory which federal courts have applied
under Section 101(a)(5) reflects the influence of both natural law and utilitarian theory,
with a heavier stress on utilitarianism. Natural law concepts appeared in federal cases
' 78 Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union, Local 6, 391 U.S, 492, 497 (1968); see
Christensen, supra note 173, at 246-47.
' 79 Wirtz, 391 U.S. at 504.
1 " See, Beaird and Player, supra note 173, at 406; Christensen, supra note 173, at 244-47; Note,
Substantive and Procedural Due Process, supra note 173, at 404,
191 Gleason, '300 F. Supp. at 1253 ("One cannot assume that an accused is guilty").
192 Id. at 1255-56 n.10. ("Sentences" were not separately imposed on each charge). See also
International Blid. of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 252 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("["ntis] case is in the category of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, where a conviction might
have been valid under one charge but would have been invalid under the other"); Parks, 314 F.2d
at 928 (4th Cir. 1963) (Sopor, C.J., dissenting) ("[R]ights and constitutional safeguards of a person
accused of crime and of a person convicted of crime ... should be afforded a law abiding work[er]");
Gulickson v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457, 466 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ("A union like a State may not entrust
the determination o ['whether [one] is innocent or guilty to a tribunal 'organized to convict,'" (quoting
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 5l0 (1986) (a death penalty case)).
388 See, e.g., Ritz V. O'Donnell, 566 F.2d 731, 735 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Tincher, 520 F.2d at 854;
Null v, Carpenters Dist. Council of Houston, 239 F. Supp. 809, 814 (S.D. Tex. 1965). This concept
has been applied to the requirement of written disciplinary charges and courts have held that the
complaint need not include "the elaborate specificity of a criminal indictment." Curtis v. IA'I'SE,
687 F.2d 1024, 1027 (7th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Berg v. Watson, 417 F. Supp. 806, 810 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Eisman v. Baltimore Regl. it. Bd. of Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America, 352 F.
Stipp. 429, 435 (D. Md. 1972), aff 'd, 496 F.2d 1313 (4th Cir. 1974); Magelssen v. Local Union No.
518, Operative Plasterers' & Cement Masons' Intl Ass'n,, 233 F. Supp. 459, 461 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
See also Beaird & Player, supra note 173, at 406; Etelson & Smith, supra note 170, at 746.
'" Parks, 314 F.2d at 913; Gleason, 300 F. Supp. at 1251 n.8; Smith v. General Truck Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Union Local 467, 181 F. Supp. 14, 17, 20 (S.D. Cal. 1960). See Beaird
& Player, supra note 173, at 406 ("IS]trong parallels can and will be drawn between union proceed-
ings and administrative law due process. At present, however, administrative due process has not
been fully transplanted into the union hall.").
188 Ritz, 566 F.2d at 737, 739.
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from the 1960's which focused on the due process requirements of fairness as applied
by the state courts before the LMRDA.'" These and other early federal decisions,
however, also articulate the utilitarian interest balancing expressed in the LMRDA's
legislative history.'" Unlike a few state court decisions which voice some concern about
the opposing interests of individual rights and private organizational autonomy,'" the
federal courts have balanced interests unique to private sector collective bargaining
structures. Identifying the goal of union democracy, the federal courts have weighed
the union member's interest in due process rights against the institutional interest in
internal control of union affairs.'"
During this initial period of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court explicitly
applied utilitarian theory to the Title IV issue of eligibility for candidacy in internal,
union elections.'" In the 1968 case of Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees Union,
Local 6,'0 ' the Court balanced the "need to protect the rights of rank-and-file members
to participate fully in the operation of their union"'" against Congress's "long-standing
policy against unnecessary governmental intrusion into internal union affairs" 193 to
achieve the goal of ensuring free and democratic elections.'" The Court overruled a
lower court finding that a union bylaw rendering ninety-three percent of its members
ineligible for union office was reasonable.'" In balancing the interests, the Supreme
Court criticized the circuit court for ignoring individual democratic rights by its sole
emphasis on the union's interest in autonomy.' 96 -
Following Wirtz, which interpreted Title IV, the Supreme Court shifted the balance
in applying utilitarian theory to the Title I Bill of Rights. In 1971, in International
Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 197 the Court rejected a line of lower court cases
for failing to stress adequately institutional interests in interpreting Section 101(a)(5).' 98
'96
	 420 F.2d at 1165 (court will interpret full and fair hearing requirement using
traditiotial concepts of due process and state common law, in addition to newly created federal
standards); Parks, 314 F.2d at 903-04 (majority cites Professor Cox's identification of state court
theories, including "natural justice"); id. at 926-27 (Soper, GI, dissenting) (applies "rules of fair
play"); Culickson v. Forest, 290 F. Supp. 457,465,467 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (court applied state law to
find denial of fair hearing, using concepts of "fair play" and conduct which would "shock the
conscience"); Smith, 181 F. Supp. at 17 (court cites constitutional standards and contract theory for
due process in union disciplinary proceedings).
'"' See supra text accompanying notes 163-70.
' 88 See supra text accompanying notes 118-23.
09 Falcone, 420 F.2d at 1164-65; Parks, 314 F.2d at 906, 913; Gleason, 300 F. Supp. at 1245,
1250-51; Null, 239 F. Supp. at 814.
'90 Section 401(e) of the LMRDA states in relevant part: "In any election required by this section
which is to be held by secret ballot ... every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a
candidate and to hold office (subject to ... reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed)." 29 U.S.C.
§ 481(e).
1 " 391 U.S. 492 (1968).
' 95 Id. at 497.
195 /d. at 496 (quoting Wirtz, 389 U.S. at 470-71 (1968)).
tc" 391 U.S. at 496 (quoting Wirtz, 389 U.S. at 470-71 (1968)).
' 93 1d. at 502-05. The union bylaw limited eligibility For candidacy for certain union offices to
members who had served on one of three named union representative bodies. The Union argued
that this requirement fulfilled the need for union officers familiar with relevant union problems.
Id. at 503.
196 Id. at 496-97.
' 97 401 U.S. 233 (1971).
'" Id. at 242-44. Prior to Hardman, the lower federal courts had held that union discipline
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Hardeman alleged that the union violated the Section 101(a)(5)(C)ll and fair hearing
requirement by imposing discipline under a union constitutional provision forbidding
members' attempts to create dissension or working against the interests and harmony of
the union. 19 The lower courts upheld the LMRDA claim, finding no evidence of a
violation of the constitutional provision, which the courts interpreted as applying to
"threats to the union as an organization" but not to conduct such as Hardeman's, which
involved "merely personal altercations." 200 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
Congress did not intend "such a substitution of judicial for union authority to interpret
the union's regulations in order to determine the scope of offenses warranting discipline
of union members." 201 The Hardeman majority interpreted Congress's rejection of a
requirement that disciplinary charges be based only on previously published written
union rules as a general congressional policy preserving union autonomy to determine
the scope of offenses covered by specific written rules. 2 u2 Under this policy, the Court
refused to review the union's interpretation of this constitutional provision. 2"
Having placed the construction of disciplinary rules solely under union control, the
Court limited judicial review to determining whether some evidence existed to support
the disciplinary charges. 204 The Court found that this standard achieved a balance
between protecting the individual member's due process rights and Congress's concern
for union autonomy. 205 In his dissent, Justice Douglas focused on the need for judicial
oversight to assure the fairness required by due process. 2m While recognizing that the
could be based only on explicit provisions in the union constitution and bylaws, and these would
be strictly construed. See, e.g., Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
391 U.S. 935 (1968); Simmons v. Local 713, Textile Workers, 350 F.2d 1012, 1017 (4th Cir. 1965);
Allen v. Theatrical Employees, 338 F.2d 309, 316 (5th Cir. 1964); Boggs v. 1BEW, 326 F. Stipp. 1,
3 (11 Mont. 1971); see discussion of above cases in Beaird & Player, supra note 173, at 400-02.
1J0 401  U.S. at 236-37. Hardernan was also charged with "threatening and using force to
restrain an officer of the local lodge from properly discharging the duties of his office." Id. at 236.
The union disciplinary tribunal returned a general verdict, finding Hardman "guilty as charged."
Id. at 237.
2", Id, at 242. The Fifth Circuit interpreted the union constitutional provision in this manner
in Boilermakers v. Braswell, 388 F.2d 193, 199 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 935 (1968), and this
was, in turn, the basis for the district court's decision in Hardernan as affirmed by the Fifth Circuit.
920 F.2d 485 (5th Cir. 1969).
20 L Hardman, 401 U.S. at 242-43.
202 Id. at 243-44,
203 Id. at 244-45, The Court stated that "if a union may discipline its members for offenses not
proscribed by written rules at all, it is surely a futile exercise for a court to construe the written
rules in order to determine whether particular conduct falls within or without their scope." Id.
2" Id. at 246. Federal courts applied this standard of review before Hardman. Beaird & Player,
supra note 173, at 908.
2°' 401 U.S. at 246. While the Hardeman Court applied the "some evidence" standard in order
to maintain a narrow scope of judicial review, as Professor SWIMICI'S notes, the state court application
of the "some evidence" standard before the LMRDA was "often but an apologetic prelude to a full
re-evaluation of the evidence, justified by a holding that the findings were 'totally unsustained. —
Summers, supra note 81, at 185. Summers notes further that the state courts refused to engage in
this broad review "almost exclusively" in cases where members "had communist ties." Id. The scope
of judicial review of administrative hearings is defined by a "substantial evidence" standard. 5 U.S.C.
706(2)(E) (1982).
Hardeman, 401 U.S. at 250 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas found that Hardeman's
substantive rights were denied when the union unposed discipline without any evidence to support
the charges. Id.
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scope of judicial review is more limited in union proceedings than administrative hear-
ings, Justice Douglas maintained that judicial interpretation of union disciplinary pro-
visions was needed in order "to check the intemperate use of union power." 207
The Hardeman Court's utilitarian interest balancing severely limited judicial inter-
vention under Section 101(a)(5) by eliminating the judicial role in interpreting union
constitutions and bylaws. This limitation represents a significant departure not only from
prior federal cases, but also from state court decisions which had applied broad judicial
discretion to interpret the scope of union disciplinary provisions. 2°8
 This shift in favor
of the union's interest coincided with and may have been influenced by the Court's
increased attention to administrative agencies' institutional interests in expediency under
constitutional due process theory. 202
F011owing Hardeman, the federal courts have been sensitive to their limited role in
reviewing union disciplinary hearings, particularly when the sufficiency of the evidence
is at issue. 210
 In other procedural issues, courts have recognized the importance of
institutional interests but have continued to invalidate disciplinary hearings where evi-
dence of unfair procedures exists. The right to an impartial hearing historically has
presented difficulties both in reconciling opposing interests under constitutional theory
and in state court union discipline cases. 2 " While reluctant to interfere with internal
disciplinary processes, the federal courts have held that the right has been denied,
particularly in cases of "built in bias," where the structure of disciplinary proceedings is
inherently prejudicial .212
 In one case involving built-in bias, however, a federal court,
2'" Id, at 251,
208 See supra text accompanying notes 109-12.
209 See supra text accompanying notes 51-80.
23 ° Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228, 1240-
41 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that the issue on appeal did not concern sufficiency of the evidence or
interpretation of the union's constitution or bylaws, which are "area[s] which Congress reserved to
the unions."); Ritz, 566 F.2d at 736-37 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (describing the "limited judicial role staked
out by the Supreme Court" in Hardeman); Mandaglio v. United Bd of Carpenters & Joiners of
America, 575 F. Supp. 646, 651 n,7 (E,D.N.Y. 1983) ("Ilk is not a function of this court to determine
what is and is not a violation of the union's constitution and bylaws.").
21 1 See supra text accompanying notes 75-80 and notes 113-17. See also Klein, UAW Public
Review Board Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 304 (1964); Oberer, Voluntary Impartial Review of Labor, 58
MICR. L, REV. 55 (1959) (discussing the independent public review board created by the UAW
constitution to review internal union affairs, including union disciplinary hearings).
212
 Rosario v. Amalgamated Ladies' Garment Cutters' Union, Local 10, 605 F.2d 1228, 1243
(2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980) (bias found where disciplinary charges were tried
on remand by same tribunal which had originally imposed discipline); Stein v. Mutuel Clerks' Guild
of Mass., 560 F.2d 486, 491 (1st Cir. 1977) (bias found where union "prosecutor" participated in
disciplinary tribunal's private deliberation); Semancik v. UMW Dist. #5, 466 F.2d 144, 149-50 (3d
Cir. 1972) (bias found where tribunal was made up of incumbent union board members whose re-
election had been contested by individuals on trial); Perry v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,
638 F. Supp. 1441, 1448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (distinguishing Hardeman, court found bias where two
charging parties sat on executive board judging disciplinary charges); Kiepura v. Local Union 1091,
USWA, 358 F. Supp. 987, 991 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (bias found where members of trial committee were
witnesses to the alleged offenses; bias also found where accused who had been a candidate for
union office was tried by union officers). See also Beaird & Player, supra note 173, at 411; Etelson
& Smith, supra note 170, at 748.
A court also may find that the right to an impartial hearing has been denied based on the
"subjective bias" of the tribunal members, although proof of actual prejudgment or prejudice is
more difficult. See, e,g., Frye v. United Steelworkers of America, 767 F.2d 1216, 1225 (7th Cir.
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citing the "distinctly narrower supervisory role over union disciplinary proceeclings" 2"
required by Hardeman, refused to intervene in disciplinary proceedings absent proof of
grievous unfairness.2 " While acknowledging that the evidence of the union appellate
board members' conflicts of interests would have required judicial disqualification in
other adjudicative contexts, the court found no denial of the right to an impartial hearing
in the union disciplinary setting. 215
Consistent with Hardernan, the Supreme Court recently applied utilitarian theory to
another Title I provision, again emphasizing the union's interest in institutional auton-
omy. In the 1982 case of United Steelworkers of America v. Sadlowski,"" the Court held that
a union rule that prohibited candidates running for union office from accepting non-
member campaign contributions did not violate Section 101(a)(2)'s free speech protec-
tions, 217 Using a reasonableness standard to balance the individual's interest in free
speech against the union's interest in organizational autonomy, 2 " the Court concluded
that "the ability of insurgent union members to wage an effective campaign" 2 " was
lawfully limited by the union rule which furthered "the union's legitimate interest in
reducing outsider interference with union affairs." 22°
The federal courts, like state courts and Congress, have applied a constitutional
analogy to internal union processes. In Section 101(a)(5) cases, the federal courts have
further refined structural analogies between unions and government by identifying
parallels between judicial review of union disciplinary proceedings and review in other
adjudicative contexts, particularly administrative hearings. Judicial interpretation in
union discipline cases also reflects the increasing influence of utilitarian due process
theory applied in constitutional law. The Supreme Court and the lower federal courts
1985) (bias charges "must be supported by specific factual allegations"; no bias proven in the instant
case); Goodman v. Laborers Intl Union of N.A., 742 F.2d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 1984) (alleged bias of
tribunal members removed from union office by accused is sufficient, if proven, to violate
§ 101(a)(5)). See also Reaird & Player, supra note 173, at 411-13; Eidson & Smith, supra note 170,
at 748-49.
2 " Ritz, 566 F.2d at 737.
214
 Id. at 739.
215 1d, at 737 11.8. In Ritz, the union's appeals board violated its own rule "that a member
disqualify himself in any case involving pilots of his own airline," where two board members were
employed by the same airlines as two of the charging parties, who were also union officers at the
time they filed the charges. Id. at 737. While acknowledging both the rule's purpose as "avoid[ingl
any possibility of bias in favor of a party with whom one is acquainted and may have worked" and
"fclurrent developments in federal judicial recusals" to require the "utmost punctilio," the court
found that the plaintiff received a full and fair hearing. Id. at 737 11.8. The dissenting judge
emphasized the lack of fairness resulting from violation of the rule as well as from other aspects of
the hearing, including evidence of a political motivation for filing the charges against the union
members. Id. at 739-41, 747-48 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting).
R111 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
212
 Id. at 112.
218 1d. at 111-12. The Court derived the reasonableness standard from the § 101(a)(2) reason-
able rules provision. The Court determined that this provision proved that Congress did not intend
that § 101(a)(2) would be coextensive with the first amendment, which applies a strict scrutiny
standard. Id. at I 1 1. Rather, the Court found that Congress "intended § 101(a)(2) to restate a
principal First Amendment value — the right to speak one's mind without fear of reprisal." Id.
2 " Id. at 112.
220 Id. Four justices dissented. They based their dissent on the advantage the rule provided
incumbent officers given the challengers' need to raise funds from outside sources in order to
launch an effective campaign. Id. at 121-31.
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have explicitly applied utilitarian interest balancing in Title I cases, weighing the indi-
vidual's interest in democratic rights against the union's institutional interest in internal
autonomy. In its single case interpretating Section 101(a)(5), the Court has indicated a
narrow view of due process protections, closely paralleling its reasoning in administrative
due process cases by striking the balance in favor of institutional interests.
III. PLACING THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS OF UNION MEMBERS INTO PERSPECTIVE
A. Due Process in the Labor Relations Context
The due process theories which courts have used to interpret both constitutional
and LMRDA due process rights have shared a common evolution from natural law
theory to utilitarianism. 221 Beyond tracking these similarities, describing the content of
due process theories is important to understanding judicial interpretation of procedural
due process from a broader perspective. With regard to union members' due process
rights the courts' use of utilitarian theory is crucial to placing these statutory rights into
the broader setting of collective bargaining. This perspective of due process in labor
relations is tied to the legislative and judicial characterization of unions and employers
as public or private institutions. The publidprivate distinction, 222 together with utilitarian
theory, rationalizes the statutory imposition of due process obligations on unions, while
leaving due process in the workplace to collective bargaining.
The private nature of collective bargaining is central to fitting the LMRDA due
process requirements into a broader labor relations context. The dominant theory of
collective bargaining under the NLRA, which one commentator has characterized as
"industrial pluralism," 223 is grounded on the view of collective bargaining as a private
2" See supra text accompanying notes 8-53,88-108,160-72, and 186-220.
222 The description of the publidprivate distinction and its key role in labor law theory relies
heavily on the work of Professor Karl Klare, particularly on his article, Public/Private Distinction,
supra note 152.
This Article uses the term "public" to refer to institutions, such as the courts or governmental
agencies, in which democratic rights are constitutionally or statutorily afforded to individuals subject
to the institution's power. "Public rights" refer to these democratic rights identified with the public
institution, such as due process rights. The term "private" refers to institutions or organizations
which are not constitutionally or statutorily required to afford democratic rights to individuals
subject to the institution's power. As the Article will show, these terms are meaningful when
conceptualized as a continuum rather than having fixed characteristics.
22' Professor Stone has characterized collective bargaining under the NLRA as industrial plu-
ralism. See Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509 (1981) [hereinafter
Stone, Post-War Paradigm]. See also Stone, The Structure of Post-War Relations, XI REV. OF L. & Soc.
CHANGE 125 (1982-83) [hereinafter Stone, Structure of Labor Relations]. Other commentators have
described labor relations theory under the NLRA as consistent with an industrial pluralist view. See
J. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW (1983); Klare, Labor Law as Ideology:
Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law, 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 450 (1981) [hereinafter
Klare, Labor Law as Ideology]; Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941,62 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1978); Klare, Labor Law and the Liberal Political
Imagination, 12 SOCIALIST REv. 45 (1982) [hereinafter Klare, Liberal Political Imagination]; Lynd,
Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald Cox, 4 INous. REL. L.J. 483 (1981). See
also Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152.
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process of negotiaions b'etween the employer and the union, with as little judicial
intervention as poisible. 224 The product of negotiations — the collective bargaining
agreement — sets the terms for a system of industrial self-government225 regulated by
the parties themselves. 226 The parties normally resolve disagreements over contract
interpretation, including employee discipline, under the contractual grievance/arbitra-
tion provisions, rather than through litigation. 2" The no-strike clause is the quid pro quo
for the grievance/arbitration system of dispute settlement. 228
Industrial pluralist theory highly values the grievance/arbitration process as a peace-
ful, structured method for addressing labor relations problems independent of the
courts. 229 The arbitrator is a private third party, chosen and paid by the union and the
employer. 2" The Supreme Court, in creating and interpreting the industrial common
law,"' has emphasized the arbitrator's expertise in resolving issues unique to collective
bargaining in the industrial setting. The Court has described the arbitration process as
"the very heart of the system of industrial self-government." 2" Arbitration thus brings
2" Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 223, at 458, 480; Klare, Liberal Political Imagination,
supra note 223, at 51-53;.Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1511-15; Klare, PublielPrivate
Distinction, supra note 152, at 1385-1401. The Supreme Court has emphasized the private nature
of collective bargaining in its interpretation of § 8(d) of the NLRA, and has required good faith
bargaining without compulsion to agree to concessions. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99,
108 (1970) ("[T]he fundamental premise on which the [NLRA] is based [is] private bargaining
under governmental supervision of the procedure alone, without any official compulsion over the
actual terms of the contract.").
22 ' United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf' Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
229 The Supreme Court has described the collective bargaining agreement as the product of
the union and employer's decision to "havie their] relationship governed by an agreed-upon rule
of law." Id. The Court consistently applies a governmental analogy to the private contract, viewing
the collective bargaining agreement as "more than a contract; it is a generalized code to govern a
myriad of cases which the draft[ers] cannot wholly anticipate." Id. at 578.
227 Id. at 581. ("The processing of disputes through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle
by which meaning and content are given to the collective bargaining agreement.").
228 See, e.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 248 (1970);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). The use of the term quid pro quo
has been criticized as falsely "connot[ing] an equal exchange" rather than describing "the basic
tradeoff ... [which] is usually dramatically skewed in management's Favor." Klare, Public/Private
Distinction, supra note 152, at 1410 n.221. The inequality results from the usually "absolute and
unlimited" nature of the no-strike clause, while arbitration does not extend to "'non-arbitrable'
issues, that is, to issues within the employer's reserved managerial prerogatives." Mare, Liberal
Political Imagination, supra note 223, at 52-53; Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at
1410 n.221. The inequality of exchange is increased by the prevalent acceptance of management's
view of the contract by most arbitrators. Id. See also Lynd, Investment Decisions and the Quid Pro Quo
Myth, 29 CASE WESTERN RES. L. REV. 396 (1979); Klare, Labor Law as ideology, supra note 223, at
468 n.65.
229 Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 224, at 462-66; Klare, Liberal Political Imagination,
supra note 223, at 57-59; Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1515-16.
2" The collective bargaining agreement normally includes provisions for the method of choos-
ing the arbitrator and the division of payment of arbitration expenses. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
How ARBITRATION WORKS, 19-20, 135-37 (4th ed. 1985).
23' United Steelworkers v, Warrior & Gulf' Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960).
232 1d. at 581-82. Warrior & Gulf is part of the Steelworkers Trilogy, which includes United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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democratic values from the political and governmental system into the economic struc-
tures of private industry. 2" The political and economic systems remain separated, 234
however, and a private body of arbitral decisions has been developed which overwhelm-
ingly favors the employer's managerial control as the method to preserve industrial
order. 233 By maintaining the employer's hierarchical control, arbitrators help legitimize
the undemocratic structure of workplace authority. 239
Comparing union members' statutory due process rights with the contractual due
process rights of employees under grievance/arbitration provisions reveals significant
differences. The LMRDA's Section 101(a)(5) legislatively affirms the public interest in
providing due process protection of the property right in union membership which state
courts recognized before the LMRDA.237 In the view of Congress and the courts, how-
ever, employment alone does not create a property interest in a job. 238 Employees who
contest disciplinary actions gain procedural due process protection only by waiving the
statutory right to strike in exchange for a grievance/arbitration clause in the collective
bargaining agreement. 239 Furthermore, grievance/arbitration procedures are inferior to
Section 101(a)(5) procedural rights in some respects. Arbitration hearings occur following
disciplinary action, often after months of delay. 24° Furthermore, although the right to
an impartial decision-maker appears to be better protected by the third party arbitrator,
arbitral doctrine heavily favors managerial prerogatives in disciplinary and business
decisions affecting employees. 241
2" Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1515-16, 1572-73; Klare, Public/Private Distinc-
tion, supra note 152, at 1359, 1409; Summers, Industrial Democracy: America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28
CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 29, 34 (1979).
"4 Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1565, 1572-73, 1579-80; Klare, Public/Private
Distinction, supra note 152, at 1416-17; Stone, Structure of Labor Relations, supra note 223, at 125-
26, 131-32.
2" Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1565, 1579-80; Klare, Labor Law as Ideology,
supra note 223, at 468 n.65; Klare, PublidPrivate Distinction, supra note 152, at 1410 n.221; Stone,
Structure of Labor Relations, supra note 223, at 131-32.
"6 Klare, Liberal Political Imagination, supra note 223, at 52-53; Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra
note 223, at 1509, 1572-73; Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 1400-01, 1417-18;
See also R. EDWARDS, CONTESTED TERRAIN: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WORKPLACE IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 109 (1979).
2" See S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2324; 1 LEG. HIST. 404; H. R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), reprinted
in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2430, 1 LEG. HIST. 765 (union members "are the real
owners of the money and property of [the labor] organization").
2" Klare, PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 152, at 1367; cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 567 (1972) (nontenured professor had no property interest in a teaching position where
the decision on rehiring for another year was left to "the unfettered discretion of university
officials"). See also Summers, supra note 233, at 44 n.86 (describing the view "that the employee has
no interest in continued employment entitled to legal protection" as an "anachronistic assumption").
239
	
supra note 229 and accompanying text.
24° F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 230 at 9 (4th ed. 1985). While citing arbitration's
relative speed when compared to litigation, the authors state that "in the bulk of the cases several
weeks or even several months are required." Id. The authors also cite the "FMCS' 31st Annual
Report," 102 LRR 245 (1979), for statistics "reporting that for cases administered by the FMCS,
the average number of days required from the time a grievance was filed until an arbitrator's award
was rendered was 223.5 days in 1978 and 268.3 days in 1977." Id. at 9 n.36. See also id. at 199-203,
713 ("obey now-grieve later" doctrine).
241 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. See also Gross & Greenfield, Arbitral Value Judg-
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Utilitarian theory and the publidprivate distinction provide a framework to explain
the inconsistency of legislating statutory due process rights for union members while
leaving due process for employees to the trade offs of collective bargaining.242 Differ-
ential treatment of due process in the union and at the workplace furthers the utilitarian
goals of the LMRDA and the NLRA. In particular, statutory due process rights for
union members promote the LMRDA goal of union democracy, while contractual due
process rights for employees promote the NLRA goals of maintaining private collective
bargaining and industrial peace. Furthermore, the LMRDA's goal of union democracy
can be used to justify the preservation of the private nature of collective bargaining.
The public or private character of unions and employers is central to this reasoning.
Congress and the judiciary have described the union as a quasi-public institution, subject
to legislated imposition of democratic rights. Congress and the courts retain the view of
the employer as a private entity, however, subject to due process obligations only by
contract.
Citing the public interest in union internal affairs, members of Congress favored
passage of the LMRDA because of the unions' role in representing employees' economic
welfare and the governmental empowerment of unions under the NLRA exclusivity
provisions. 243 The House and Senate Committee Reports identified a corresponding
governmental duty to assure responsible use of union power. 244 Congress's emphasis on
the public interest and on governmental involvement with the union transforms the
union from a private organization into a quasi-public body subject to internal regula-
t ion. 245
The industrial pluralist theory of the NLRA, in contrast, has stressed the private
nature of businesses and corporations and resulted in judicial deference to managerial
prerogatives. 24° This judicial attitude is demonstrated in the Supreme Court's protection
of employers' private power to control business decisions even when they interfere with
employees' statutory rights or may be subjects for collective bargaining. 242 In Textile
Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. , 248 for example, the Supreme
ments in Health and Safety Disputes: Management Rights over Workers' Rights, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 645
(1985). Grievants' representation may be better where the union is represented by counsel as
compared to an internal union disciplinary process in which the union may refuse to allow partic-
ipation by attorneys. The courts have held that § 101(a)(5) does not include the right to professional
counsel where neither side is allowed to have professional counsel. Beaird Sc Player, supra note 173,
at 409; Etelson & Smith, supra note 170, at 746-47.
242 See Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 1371-76, for a discussion of the courts'
and Congress's willingness to regulate unions internally as quasi-public entities, while preserving
the private status of corporations. Professor Klare concludes that lilt is doubtful that such regu-
lation of internal operating procedures would be tolerated if applied to business corporations." Id.
at 1373 n.60. Professor Klare also describes judicial manipulation of the characterization of public
or private functions of unions as "often a way of rationalizing a political choice in legal terms." Id.
at 1376.
240 See supra notes 146-53 and accompanying text.
244 Id.
247
	
supra notes 99, 153-55 and accompanying text. See also, Professor Mare's observation
that courts treat unions as quasi-public entities "by virture of their power, function and legal
authority." Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 1372.
245
	
J. ATLESON, supra note 223, at 2-21, 171-79; Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223,
at 1544-57; Klare, Public1Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 140-02.
247 See generally J. ATLEsoN, supra note 223, chpts. 7-8.
246 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
52	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 29:21
Court held that an employer does not violate Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA by closing its
entire business for admittedly anti-union reasons. 249 In the collective bargaining area,
the Supreme Court excluded the decision to partially close a business from the scope of
mandatory bargaining subjects. The Court reached this conclusion by giving great weight
to management's private interest in unilateral control over decision-making which affects
"the scope and direction of the enterprise." 2" This description of businesses and cor-
porations as private entities clearly is problematic in view of the governmental empow-
erment of business."' State incorporation laws enable business to reap the tax and limited
liability benefits of corporate structure.252 Governmental price supports retain the
strength of industries ranging from tobacco to grain export. 255
 Tax breaks for business
and taxes on imported products also support American businesses. 254 Therefore, gov-
ernmental empowerment transforms private businesses and corporations into quasi-
public bodies. As in the case of unions, this quasi-public status justifies governmental
regulation of internal organizational processes.
24° Id. at 273-74. The Darlington Court also protected managerial prerogatives where an em-
ployer closes part of his or her business for anti-union reasons by adding to the General Counsel's
burden under § 8(a)(3). Id. The Court required proof that the partial closing was "motivated by a
purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants ... and [that] the employer may reasonably
have foreseen that such closing will likely have that effect." Id. at 275. See J. ATLESON, supra note
223, at 138-42, for a discussion of Darlington.
25° First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 677 (1981). See J. ATLESON supra note 223,
at 132-35; Stone, Post-War Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1547-48; Klare, Public/Private Distinction,
supra note 152, at 1401-03. For other examples of the importance courts and the NLRB place on
the employer's private power under the NLRA, see, e.g., NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105,
112 (1956) (employer can lawfully bar nonemployee union organizer from communicating with
employees on company parking lot, which was employer's private property); Harter Equip., Inc.,
280 .
 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1986) (employer may lawfully engage in an offensive lockout and hire
temporary replacements where the purpose of the lockout is to gain an advantage in collective
bargaining).
", A number of commentators have called for the imposition of constitutional obligations on
the modern corporation which can rival the government in size, power, and control over employees.
'See D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION 11-12 (1977); A. MILLER, THE MODERN COR-
PORATE STATE (1975); Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience,
24 OKLA. L. REV. 279, 299 (1971); Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 1367 n.32
(citing Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1129 (1980)); Note, Protecting Private
Employees' Freedom of Political Speech, 18 HARV. J. ON LEG'S. 35, 38-39 (1981); Note, Free Speech, the
Private Employee, and State Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522, 530 & n.45 (1982). But see Wellington,
supra note 153, at 348 ("The need to regulate unions and corporations is undeniable; but it need
not be assumed a priori that the Constitution is the proper regulatory instrument.").
252
	 H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS 51-52, 130-43 (3d ed. 1983). As
Professor Klare notes, however, the Supreme Court has "consistently advance[d] the view that action
by government is not 'government action' for constitutional law purposes if the government's action
consists 'merely' in structuring the environment for business behavior or performing routine tasks
that underwrite private ordering the business (i.e., 'private) world." Klare, Public/Private Distinction,
supra note 152, at 1379 n.83 (emphasis in original).
255
	 e.g., Pine, U.S. Seems Ready to Pay Record Subsidy on Sale of Wheat to Soviets, Analysts Say,
Wall St. J., May 13, 1987, at 6, col. 1; One Good Subsidy Merits Another, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1987, at
611; Stern, Inspector's Call, THE NATION, Oct. 31, 1981, at 929.
254 See, e.g., Lewis, Trade Sanctions' Effect, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1987, at 21, col. 1; Peterson,
Reagan Seeks Oil Industry Tax Relief; Imports are Called Threat to Security, Wash. Post, May 7, 1987, at
A17.
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Commentators also have cited corporate power as a basis for imposing obligations
on business similar to governmental obligations under the Constitution. 255 The size and
power of some corporations rival that of state and federal governments.256 Corporate
power is particularly relevant in terms of the control employers exercise over employees'
lives both inside and outside the workplace. In addition to employers' control over
workers in such matters as setting workplace conditions and implementing massive
layoffs as in the steel and auto industries, employers are expanding the reach of their
power as the recent increase in compulsory employee drug screening demonstrates.
Through drug screening, the employer invades employees' privacy and controls em-
ployees' conduct outside the workplace, as drug tests may disclose the presence of drug
metabolites from substances ingested days or weeks earlier. 257
The breadth of employer and union power, as well as the scope of governmental
involvement with employers and unions, provide no justification for statutory procedural
due process protection for members subject to union discipline, but not for employees
subject to employer discipline. The failure to identify the need for legislated due process
in the employment context becomes clear under a natural law theory. The moral content
of natural law theory, which identifies a basic right to fair treatment in union disciplinary
proceedings, similarly calls for fairness for employees subject to the coercive power of
employer discipline.258 The increased power of both unions and employers through
governmental involvement strengthens the argument fbr similar treatment in identifying
the basic individual rights that deserve protection within these institutions.
Utilitarian theory, however, may justify the legislation of procedural due process in
unions only and may distinguish unions and employers based on their public or private
character. 250 Statutory regulation under utilitarianism would provide clue process rights
in order to achieve an external goal rather than to affirm the inherent value of fair
procedures. A utilitarian theory that only a democratic union can bring democracy to
the workplace may support the need for statutory due process rights for union mem-
bers:2w The quasi-public character of the union, and the corresponding public interest
255 See supra notes 251-52.
2" Id,
257 See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, ALCOHOL & DRUGS tN THE WORKPLACE: COSTS, CONTROLS,
AND CONTROVERSIES (1986); Spitzer, Drug Screening: Usually Unnecessary, Frequently Unreliable, and
Perhaps Unlawful, ILR REPORT, vol. XXIII, no. 2, at 21, 24 (1986); Rothstein, Screening Workers for
Drugs: A Legal and Ethical Framework, 11 EMPLOYEE REL. L. J. 422, 424 (Winter 1985/86). The
presence of metabolites weeks later is a particular problem with marijuana. Additionally, drug
screening does not show whether an individual is currently impaired. Spitzer, at 22; Rothstein, at
424.
259 See infra notes 295-303 and accompanying text. See also Summers, supra note 233, at 48,
identifying "the human dignity of the individual worker" as the basis for protecting a basic right
against unjust discharge.
259 The relation between the utilitarianism means•ends approach and the public/private dis-
tinction comports with Professor Klare's criticism that "[tihe publidprivate distinction poses as an
analytical tool in labor law, but it functions more as a form of political rhetoric used to justify
particular results." Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 1361.
29" See Summers, Public Interest, supra note 154, at 614-15, 618, 624, where Professor Summers
asserts that the public interest in union democracy is grounded in the public interest in collective
bargaining as "an instrument of industrial democracy" in which "the workers will have a voice
through their union in determining the terms and conditions of their employment." Id. at 615.
Professor Summers states that the lack of democratic processes within corporations requires de-
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in democracy within the union's internal processes, strengthens this utilitarian argu-
ment.261
 The union may then extend its democratic values and processes to the workplace
through the private collective bargaining system. 262
A series of steps in instrumentalist reasoning extends this utilitarian approach.
Statutory due process for union members furthers the goal of internal union democracy
by protecting the individual rights of union members subject to the union's disciplinary
power. Through a democratically run union, achieved by adhering to due process and
other Title I and Title IV rights, union members can participate in formulating union
policy. The members' influence over union policy will make the union more represen-
tative by increasing member participation in collective bargaining. A democratically run
union will, in turn, bargain for democratic rights in the workplace, including procedural
due process in the grievance/arbitration system, in return for waiving the statutory right
to strike. This trade-off of statutory for contractual rights furthers two basic NLRA
goals. First, the private nature of collective bargaining and dispute resolution remains."'
Second, waiving the right to strike in exchange for arbitration channels the conflict into
institutionalized resolution structures and helps maintain industrial peace and uninter-
rupted production. 264
Utilitarian reasoning applied to due process in the labor relations context, therefore,
justifies both the direct regulation of internal union processes and the failure to impose
directly such obligations on employers. Direct regulation of employer discipline similar
to the provisions of Section 10I(a)(5) would create a floor of statutory rights upon which
the union could build in collective bargaining. 265 Such legislation, however, would be
counterproductive to the NLRA's goals of reducing governmental intervention in col-
lective bargaining and eliminating strikes during the contract term.
This due process theory requires a balance between the characterization of the
union as quasi-public and the employer as private. Thus, judicial interpretation of the
LMRDA must account adequately for the union's private interests in institutional auton-
omy as well as the public interest in union democracy. The Supreme Court demonstrated
this concern in Hardeman when it applied utilitarian reasoning to stress the private nature
of internal union processes, particularly in defining the scope of union discipline. 266
mocracy within unions. He concludes that "[u]nion democracy is, in this sense, the antidote for
corporate autocracy." Id. at 624.
Professor Cox also concludes that union democracy is essential in order to perform the union's
functions of "extending the rule of law" to industry through enforcing collective bargaining agree-
ments and "enabl[ing] workers to participate jointly with management in the government of their
industrial lives." Cox, Role of Law, supra note 81, at 610.
261 Summers, Public Interest, supra note 154, at 615.
262 See supra note 260.
265 See supra notes 223-29 and accompanying text.
261 Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 223, at 452, 454, 459-60, 463, 482; Stone, Post-War
Paradigm, supra note 223, at 1542, 1528, 1563-73; Klare, PubliclPrivate Distinction, supra note 152,
at 1400-01, 1407-11.
265 Cf. Wellington, supra note 153, at 365, identifying the importance of welfare legislation,
such as minimum wage laws, "which provide a foundation upon which unions may build in
bargaining with management." See also Summers, supra note 233, at 48-49.
256 See supra text accompanying notes 197-209. The Court showed this same concern in Sadlowski
in the context of union elections. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20. See also Professor
Klare's discussion of judicial treatment of unions as both quasi-public and private organizations and
the Court's shift in Hardeman, in Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152, at 1372-74.
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Federal judicial interpretation of other due process rights, including the right to an
impartial tribunal, also reflects the concern for union autonomy through disciplinary
decision-making by union members and off ►cials.2 fi7 Protecting the right to an unbiased
judge by requiring third party arbitrators would expand the public character of the
union, making it similar to governmental agencies or criminal proceedings.
One can conceptualize the due process rights of union members and employees and
the public or private character of unions and employers along a continuum of public
and private institutions, rather than as a clearly defined public/private boundary. The
NLRA's industrial pluralist theory places the employer close to the private end of the
continuum. Even the private sector employer is not at the extreme of the private pole,
however, because the public interest in regulation under the NLRA and the resulting
contractual due process rights impose certain obligations identified with public institu-
tions. Unions, as quasi-public organizations, appear farther from the private pole of the
spectrum. Because the public right to a full and fair hearing prior to disciplinary action
is counterbalanced by the judicial emphasis on union autonomy, the union is near the
middle of the continuum.
B. Due Process in the Political and Economic Sectors
Utilitarian theory and the publiciprivate distinction also permit an overview of
procedural due process beyond the labor relations context. Governmental agencies, as
well as unions and employers, may occupy different positions on the public/private
continuum. A single continuum may exist for institutions from both sectors because of'
the convergence of constitutional and statutory due process under utilitarian theory.
Utilitarianism also underlies the contractual nature of due process rights in private sector
employment under an industrial pluralist theory. Governmental and private institutions
may be located on the publidprivate spectrum as shown in Figure 1 on page 63.
The stated goals of constitutional and statutory due process theories are different.
Under constitutional theory, the goal is accuracy in administrative decision-making, 768
while LMRDA utilitarian theory seeks to further union democracy. Utilitarian theory
for due process under the NLRA promotes a third goal of promoting industrial peace
through private grievance/arbitration processes. Despite these differences, a single spec-
trum may be created based on the similar interests balanced under utilitarian theory in
each context. The courts and Congress make constitutional and statutory due process
determinations by balancing institutional interests against an individual's interest in fair
procedures. In administrative agency cases, the institutional interest is ensuring govern-
mental efficiency through internal control over decisions to terminate a public benefit
or public employment. Under the LMRDA, the union has an institutional interest in
internal autonomy in carrying out disciplinary action against union members. Under the
NLRA, the institutional due process interest is preserving the private character of col-
lective bargaining.
Utilitarian interest balancing determines the institution's location on the due process
continuum. As the balancing always weighs public rights to due process against private
institutional autonomy, the location between the two poles will not depend strictly on
the formal definition of an institution as public or private. Rather, placement on the
26 See supra notes 211-15 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text,
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spectrum will depend on the relative weight accorded the opposing interests under
utilitarian balancing, which will, in turn, determine the scope of due process procedural
protection.
Judicial and legislative application of interest balancing explains the specific location
of the institutions in Figure 1. Nonunionized private sector employers are located near
the private pole because the Constitution, statutes, and employment contracts generally
do not obligate them to provide employees with procedural protections against discipli-
nary actions 26
 Because of the broad scope of procedural due process in that setting, 27 0
criminal proceedings are placed at the public pole. Moving away from the public pole,
parole and probation revocation hearings are subject to the next broadest scope of
protection because of the weight placed on the liberty interest in parole or probation.
One important due process protection required in revocation hearings is the right to an
independent parole or probation board."' The degree of independence required of the
decision-maker often reflects the weight afforded the opposing interests 02 and is im-
portant in determining location on the continuum.
Judicial interpretation of the right to an impartial decision-maker also is important
in placing administrative hearings for welfare benefit termination farther from the public
pole. While holding that an administrative agency must provide a full evidentiary hearing
prior to terminating welfare benefits, the Supreme Court has decided-that an agency
employee with prior involvement in the case, but who had not participated in the
particular determination under review, was sufficiently impartial. 475 Preliminary hearings
for parole or probation revocation occupy the same point as welfare termination hear-
ings. Though parolees and probationers are constitutionally entitled to a full evidentiary
28° The employment at will doctrine has been modified to some extent in state courts which
have held private employers to a 'just cause" standard for discharge in cases where an implied
contract or a public policy basis could be identified to provide employment rights. These developing
common law protections are more analogous to substantive due process rights than to procedural
due process. For discussions of changes in the doctrine of employment at will, see Summers, The
Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employees: Fair Representation and Employment at Will,
52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082 (1984); Note, Protecting Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. Rev. 1931 (1983); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
27° See supra notes 21-37 and accompanying text.
271 Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 785-86 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488-
89 (1972). Other procedural protections required at this stage include written notice of claimed
parole or probation violations; a hearing within a reasonable time; disclosure of evidence against
the defendant; the right to present evidence; the right to confrontation, unless good cause is shown
to limit this right; and a written statement by the facffinders of evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking probation or parole. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 486; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489. The Court left
the right to appointed counsel to a case-by-case determination. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 790.
"2 See supra notes 68, 75-80, 122-23, 211-15 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
right to an impartial judge, see Redish and Marshall. Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455 (1986).
'” Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970). See supra notes 59-68 and accompanying text.
Other procedural protections include timely notice of the reasons for benefits termination; right to
confront witnesses; presentation of oral arguments and evidence; right to retain counsel; and a
statement of both the reasons for the determination and the evidence relied on. Goldberg, 397 U.S.
at 267-71. The Court left open the question of whether the scope of the hearing could be limited
where no factual issues are in dispute. Id. at 268 n.15.
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hearing to determine probable cause for their arrest, the Supreme Court has held that
a parole or probation officer not involved in the case may act as decision-maker. 271
Administrative agency determinations prior to termination of other public benefits
are located at the next point of the spectrum. They are placed farther from the public
pole than agencies responsible for welfare benefits based on the Supreme Court's holding
that the Constitution does not obligate these agencies to provide a full evidentiary hearing
prior to terminating benefits. 275 This difference in the scope of due process protections
results from utilitarian interest balancing. The Supreme Court has held that the individ-
ual's interest in avoiding deprivation of welfare benefits is greater than the interest in
retaining other public benefits. 276 Thus, in balancing the interests for non-welfare agen-
cies, the institutional concern for expediency outweighs the individual's need for fair
procedures prior to deprivation of property. 277
Union disciplinary proceedings are closer to the middle of the publidprivate spec-
trum than administrative agency determinations. While the statutory requirement for a
full and fair hearing prior to any union discipline could reverse the positions of unions
and administrative agencies dealing with non-welfare benefits, the standard for judicial
review is the basis for their positions on the spectrum. In Hardeman, the Supreme Court
emphasized the narrow scope of judicial review of union disciplinary determinations,
both in interpreting the scope of disciplinary charges and in reviewing a finding of guilt
under a "some evidence" standard. 278 In reaching this decision, the Court noted the
union's interest in retaining autonomy over disciplinary proceedings. J udicial review of
adminisiTtative agency determinations under a "substantial evidence" standard, 279 how-
ever; provides room for greater judicial intervention, and places the agencies closer to
the public pole of the spectrum.
The distinction between providing a full hearing before or after disciplinary action
undeilies the relative locations of unions and public employers on the spectrum. Due
process in unions is also distinguished by the fact that the LMRDA guarantees all union
members due process rights, while constitutional procedural due process rights apply
only to public employees who can show a property interest in their jobs. 28° This places
governmental agencies acting as public employers closer to the private pole than unions,
274 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 485-87.
27° Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 340 (1976). See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying
text.
22 " Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 340-43. The Eldridge Court compared the degree of potential depri-
vation created by the loss of welfare benefits with the loss of disability benefits, and concluded that
"[i]n view of [the terminated disability recipient's] potential sources of temporary income, there is
less reason here than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle, established by our decisions,
that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action."
at 343.	 •
277 See Mashaw, supra note 14, at 48-49. The Eldridge Court found that the adequacy of the
pretermination procedures was strengthened by the provision of a post-termination right to an
evidentiary hearing and judicial review. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349.
27° See supra notes 204-05 and accompanying text.
2" Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). Sec B. Scion/Atm, AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAW 591-606 (1976) for a discussion of the substantial evidence standard.
2°0 See supra note 52 and accompanying text. A public employee may also show a liberty interest
where the public employer's action injures the employee's reputation. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-
74.
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even over the midway point of the continuum. The Supreme Court, in Cleveland Board
of Education v. Loudermill, 2" decided that constitutional procedural due process did not
require a full and fair hearing prior to the termination of public employees. 282 The
Supreme Court balanced the competing interests and required the government to give
notice of the reasons for discharge and provide an opportunity to respond orally or in
writing before discharge.283 These procedures reduced the possibility of erroneous de-
cision-making while recognizing the public employer's interest in quickly removing an
unsatisfactory employee. 284 The Court found this abbreviated process adequate partly
because the employee had a right to a full post-termination hearing. 285
Requiring a prior hearing emphasizes the individual's interest in fair procedures,
while providing a hearing only after the discharge demonstrates concern for institutional
interests. The disciplinary determination itself may be affected, as the public employee
who is only provided a post-discharge hearing must overcome a decision already reached
by the agency.286
 This is especially difficult when a decision-maker from the same agency
conducts the post-termination hearing. 287
While contractual due process in unionized private sector employment resembles
the post-termination hearing constitutionally required for public sector employees, the
private sector collective bargaining agreement does not usually require notice or an
opportunity to respond prior to discharge. Therefore, unionized private sector employ-
ers are closer to the private pole than either union or non-union public employers. The
contractual nature of procedural due process in private sector employment, involving
the employees' waiver of statutory rights, also emphasizes the private character of the
unionized private sector employer: 288
281 470 U.S. 532 (1985). See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Loudermill.
282
 Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
283 Id. at 542-46.
284
 Id. at 545-46.
288 Id. at 545.
288 Most federal employees who contest their discharge lose. In fiscal year 1970, for example,
less than 20% of federal employees successfully contested removal within their federal agencies.
Merrill, Procedures for Adverse Actions Against Federal Employees, 59 VA. L. Ray. 196, 204 n.35 (1973).
Professor Merrill analyzes the adverse action process in federal employment and recommends
system reforms, including the additional right to an evidentiary hearing before a proposed adverse
action becomes effective. Id. at 240-46.
287 Id. at 248-51 (proposing that hearing officers for federal adverse action hearings be assigned
from a pool established and employed by the Civil Service Commission, rather than from the
employing agency).
288 The arbitration standard under collective bargaining agreements requiring "just cause" for
disciplinary actions would create protections analogous to substantive due process, which examines
the reasonableness of governmental actions. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 230 at 650-
55, 653 n.10, 654 n.19 (4th ed. 1985) (authors discuss the 'just cause" standard, giving examples
of arbitrators' articulation of the standard as a "test of fairness and reasonableness" and requiring
management to "have a reasonable basis for its actions and follow fair procedures"); see also L.
TRIBE, supra note 8, at 433. This substantive review of employers' decision making does not create
a broader scope of due process protection in private sector union workplace than within unions, as
the LMRDA provides protection against union discipline which punishes members for exercising
their substantive rights, such as the freedom of speech under 101(a)(2). See generally Note, Sub-
stantive and Procedural Due Process, supra note 173.
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The publidprivate spectrum demonstrates the absence of a clear division between
so-called "public" and "private" institutions. 289 Applying utilitarian interest balancing,
courts and Congress have defined the scope of procedural due process by adjusting the
weight placed on public or private interests. This emphasis, in turn, determines the
location on the continuum. Thus, where an individual's interest in public rights to due
process outweighs institutional interests in private internal control, an organization will
be closer to the public pole, regardless of its label as a private organization.
The continuum becomes more meaningful if the poles also represent the political
and economic spheres, corresponding to the public and private poles respectively, as
shown in Figure 2 on page 64. This distinction is consistent with the industrial pluralist
emphasis on the private character of employers as economic organizations as distin-
guished from public political institutions. 290 Identifying the two poles as political and
economic adds another dimension to the publidprivate distinction. The political insti-
tutions of government are characterized by democratic processes both in selecting rep-
resentatives and in internal functions. On the publidprivate spectrum, therefore, the
criminal courts are both public and political institutions, as the broad scope of procedural
due process in criminal proceedings reflects the importance of the defendant's demo-
cratic political rights. At the private economic pole, however, democratic political rights
do not exist in the nonunion private sector workplace, where employees are subject to
the employer's unilateral control. Between the poles, the characterization of the insti-
tutions as public or private also reflects the scope of democratic political rights, in the
form of procedural due process, available within the institution. In the case of unions,
the added weight placed on public characteristics means that the legislature may impose
upon private organizations those democratic rights associated with the public political
sphere. For private sector employers, the emphasis on retaining their private nature as
economic institutions allows employees to gain democratic due process only through
trade offs in collective bargaining.
IV. THE CHOICE OF THEORY
The choice of a due process theory fundamentally influences the description of due
process rights in particular contexts. It is true that, regardless of the theory applied, a
problem exists in the judicial manipulation of the scope of rights. Historically, commen-
tators have criticized natural law theory because judges may determine outcomes by
defining due process according to their subjective value systems. Utilitarianism suffers
from the same problem. By emphasizing one side of the balance of interests, courts can
"9 A number of commentators have addressed the lack of a clear boundary between the public
and private sectors and challenged the continued legitimacy of making such a distinction. See Austin,
The Problem of the Legitimacy of the Welfare State, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1510 (1982); Brest, State Action
and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296 (1982); Ellickson,
Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982); Goodman, Professor Brest on State
Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331 (1982); Mnookin,
The Public/Private Dichotomy.' Political Disagreement and Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429
(1982); Klare, Public/Private Distinction, supra note 152; Stone, Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues.-
Do Public/Private Distinctions Matter?, 130 U. PA. L. R6. 1441 (1982).
'9° Courts have interpreted the NLRA to apply an industrial democracy metaphor while main-
taining the private character of collective bargaining and arbitration, independent of the courts.
See supra notes 223-36 and accompanying text.
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manipulate the scope of due process, as the courts' focus on certain interests may reflect
the same subjective values imposed under a natural law theory. 29i
Despite these common pitfalls, however, the initial choice of natural law or utilitarian
theories is crucial because of the normative differences in the theories themselves. These
differences in theoretical content can determine whether due process rights should be
developed contractually, judicially, or through legislation. Furthermore, depending upon
the theory, the absence of due process rights may or may not be justified in a particular
setting.
The labor relations context provides an example of the importance of theory. Prior
to the LMRDA, state courts reflected constitutional due process analysis by applying
natural law concepts to internal union affairs. 292 In developing union members' due
process rights under a natural law theory, courts identified the members' basic moral
right to fair treatment before union discipline regardless of the positive law of the union
constitution or bylaws. Under the LMRDA, the shift to utilitarian theory removed the
moral content from the identification of rights. 293 Union members' rights are protected
in order to serve an external goal rather than for their intrinsic moral value. Legislating
due process and other democratic rights for union members furthers the goal of union
democracy and provides the foundation for more representative union leadership. These
goals extend to the workplace under the utilitarianism of the NLRA. Democratically
elected union leaders will bargain for democratic rights in employment, such as arbitra-
tion in exchange for a no-strike clause, which promote the statutory goal of uninter-
rupted production. In contrast to a natural law theory which protects due process rights
based on the moral grounds of fairness and justice, this utilitarian approach values
employees' due process rights solely as an incentive for the union to waive the right to
strike.294
Utilitarianism's exclusive focus on external goals provides an inadequate foundation
for a system of rights. Rights which are defined according to their instrumental worth
are perceived as lacking intrinsic value. 29s Under utilitarianism, rights are expendable if
a competing institutional interest outweighs the social utility of the individual's right. As
a result, individual rights are less stable and less meaningful than they would be under
a theory which values rights for their inherent moral content.
Rejecting utilitarian theory would influence the scope of due process rights in the
labor relations context. A due process theory based on the moral content of rights would
recognize the inherent value of fair procedures in any setting which subjects an individual
to coercive institutional power. For this reason, an individual subject to employer as well
as union discipline should have procedural due process rights. A return to a natural law
theory, however, presents problems. Although the Supreme Court has applied natural
law concepts to identify the fundamental nature of virtually the entire Bill of Rights, the
291 See L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 505.
292 See supra notes 81-117 and accompanying text.
293 See supra notes 38-50 and 163-220 and accompanying text.
294 See supra notes 228-29 and 263-64 and accompanying text.
295 For analysis of the inadequacy of utilitarianism and the need to define rights by their intrinsic
values, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 14, at 12, 136-49, 191; L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 475, 504-05,
526-27, 540-93, 559-61; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 30, 46-53, 58; Saphire, supra note 39, at 117-
24, 151-52, 155-59; Summers, supra note 48, at 2-5, 20-27.
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court has also used natural law theory to defend the "right" of employers to assert
complete and unilateral control over working conditions. 2• This preference for employer
property "rights" over employee welfare is a poor historical recommendation for the
continued use of natural law theory. 297 Thus, the procedural due process rights of union
members and employees should be protected under a theory which identifies the intrinsic
moral values of procedural due process, but which does not rely on the existence of
natural rights. Morally based procedural due process theories have focused on values of
"fairness,"298 "personal dignity and self respect," 2" and the "minimization of subservience
and helplessness."""
In the context of union discipline, a shift to an intrinsic value due process theory
would return the courts' focus to the value of fairness in disciplinary hearings. This
approach, by reducing the emphasis on union institutional interests, would expand the
scope of individual rights. In particular, courts could give greater attention to problematic
issues such as the right to an impartial tribunal and interpreting the scope of disciplinary
provisions."' At the workplace, an intrinsic value theory would affect both the existence
and the scope of rights. With this theoretical shift, the right to grievance/arbitration
procedures would be based on the intrinsic value of fair and just process before imposing
employer discipline, rather than as a means to attaining uninterrupted production.
Recognizing the basic right of union members and employees to fair treatment
requires a consistent approach to due process protection. Thus, statutory protection of
due process for union members under the LMRDA calls for legislating due process
rights at the workplace." 2 Such legislation would define minimum due process standards
296 Ste supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
292 See Grey, supra note 13, at 711 n.35. The author notes that while Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905) (applying natural law theory to support laissez-faire economics) was a bad decision,
"the general mode of adjudication it represents" — that of identifying fundamental values — may
still be legitimate. Id. The author further identifies the development of the constitutional right of
privacy, the right to vote, and the right to travel as the "modern offspring ... of the natural-rights
tradition of the foundEersr although the explicit source of the rights has shifted to the "Anglo-
American tradition." Id. at 717. See also Note, Specifying the Procedures, supra note 39, at 1539 n.127
("The identification of the natural law understanding of substantive due process with a laissez faire
economic philosophy ... which resulted in constitutional crisis and judicial recantation ... brought
the natural law view of due process into a disrepute from which it has never recovered.").
298 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 505; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 53; Saphire, supra note 39, at 117-
18 (identifying the need to view fairness "in terms of human dignity"); Summers, supra note 48, at
24-25.
419 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 475, 560 (also identifying "personal integrity and autonomy");
Mashaw, supra note 14, at 49-50 ("individual dignity"; "self-respect"); Saphire, supra note 39, at
118 ("personal dignity"; "attitudes included in human dignity such as integrity, self-respect, self-
esteem, resentment, and indignation"); Summers, supra note 48, at 23-24 ("humaneness and respect
for individual dignity"; "personal privacy").
869 L. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 560. For discussion of the additional intrinsic value of personal
participation in the process, see, id. at 526; Mashaw, supra note 14, at 50; Saphire, supra note 39, at
122-24; Summers, supra note 48, at 20-21.
861 See supra notes 197-215 and accompanying text.
702 Professor Summers has identified the need for statutory protection for all employees, in
union and nonunion workplaces, of "the right not to be discharged except for just cause." Summers,
supra note 234, at 47. Professor Summers' proposal is consistent with an intrinsic value theory based
on "the human dignity of the individual, for it gives him some escape from subservience to the
employer, allows him to speak his mind, enables him to demand his rights, and encourages him to
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in employment discipline without forcing employees to obtain procedural protections by
trading off their statutory right to strike. Furthermore, the inherent value of fair disci-
plinary procedures justifies extending statutory protection to both union and nonunion
workplaces. While the legislation could include provisions to cover the special needs of
a union workplace, the statutory minimum would provide a floor upon which the union
could build in collective bargaining."'
CONCLUSION
The history of procedural due process rights for union members has moved from
state court protection under a natural law theory to federal legislation supported by
utilitarian theory. This progression, as in constitutional due process interpretation, shifts
the focus from the intrinsic value of due process to the external goal achieved by
affording due process rights. Under utilitarian theory, the LMRDA protects due process
rights because they promote the goal of union democracy, rather than for their intrinsic
value of fairness. Utilitarianism is also central to the industrial pluralist theory of the
NLRA, under which due process in the workplace is a means to the end of preserving
private collective bargaining and avoiding strikes. Furthermore, instrumentalist reason-
ing can link the utilitarian theories of the LMRDA and the NLRA to justify the incon-
sistency of directly legislating union members' due process rights while leaving employ-
ees' due process rights to private contractual exchanges.
The institutional power of unions and employers establishes the need for fair
procedures in disciplining union members as well as employees. Thus, under an intrinsic
rights theory of due process, statutory due process is needed in the union and at the
workplace. Such statutory requirements would extend the scope of democratic rights
associated with governmental institutions into the private economic sector. Just as the
LMRDA's enactment regulated the union as a "quasi-public" organization, legislating
employees' due process rights would acknowledge the equally quasi-public status of the
private sector employer. Given the continually blurred distinction between the public
and private sectors, expanded statutory protection of democratic rights for employees
is both justified and desirable in order to achieve greater parity between individual rights
inside and away from the workplace.
assert himself as a person." Id. at 48. See also Summers, Individual Protection against Unjust Dismissal:
Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976).
Statutory due process in the workplace would extend substantive as well as procedural due
process, for protection against unjust discharge requires examination of the reasonableness of the
employer's actions.
'1" Summers, supra note 233, at 48-49. For the statutory floor to be meaningful, the legislated
due process rights should not be interpreted as implying the existence of a no-strike clause. Cf.
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers, Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962)
(contractual clause for final and binding arbitration implies a no-strike clause). The union may
decide to waive the right to strike during the term of the contract in exchange for other contractual
promises by the employer.
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